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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past century, glaciers around the world have retreated 
130 
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at alarming rates; the sea level has risen by half a foot or more; and 
as many as 2,000,000 species have passed into extinction. 1 Many 
have dubbed climate change and environmental degradation the 
great crises of our time; with this evidence in tow, it is hard to 
argue otherwise. Small wonder, then, that environmental litigation 
has attracted enormous attention and support as we make our way 
into the twenty-first century. But as students of environmental law 
know, a case with great merit may never get past the preliminary 
stages. Standing has been the bane of environmental lawyers for 
decades, because the harms they seek to vindicate do not always 
pass the rigid test that is more suited to traditional causes-actions 
with injuries personal and identifiable, like tort and contract. With 
the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, however, 
standing became just a little less intimidating-at least for 
sovereign entities.2 The Supreme Court held that Massachusetts 
was entitled to "special solicitude" in the standing analysis because 
it was sovereign, and therefore it passed the standing threshold in 
a global warming case where an ordinary litigant may have been 
stymied. The Supreme Court's analysis raises an interesting 
question: Are Indian tribes-which have been considered 
sovereign entities since before the . Founding, and hold lands 
facing heavy environmental pressure-entitled to "special 
solicitude" as well? We think they should be, particularly when 
litigating environmental cases. And lest anyone think this issue 
merely academic, the Federal Circuit just faced (but did not 
decide) this very question.3 
Before we outline our argument, it is important to establish our 
basic understanding of the term "sovereignty." We will discuss the 
meaning of this word throughout the paper, but the core idea is 
this: to be a sovereign entity is to be a politically legitimate group 
of landed people that is sufficiently autonomous to run its internal 
affairs and to interact with other sovereigns.4 Whether tribes can 
1. Tim Green, The Thing About Extinction, http://www.bbc.co.uk/lastchancetosee/ 
sites/about/extinction.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). 
2. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
3. Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) ("Analogizing itself to Native American tribes ... Canada argues that it has standing 
because it is a sovereign seeking to protect its sovereign interests. But to the extent that 
Native American tribes are entitled to any 'special solicitude' regarding standing ... 
Canada has not established that it is similarly situated." (citations omitted)) 
4. Diane M. Ring, What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the 
Nation-State, 49 VA.J. INT'L L. 155, 159-60 (2008). Although the meaning of "sovereignty" 
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lay claim to sovereignty as strongly as states for purposes of 
standing-and, if so, what the upshot should be-are questions 
that form the heart of this paper.5 
has "changed over the centuries and across contexts," certain "core elements" have 
remained constant: 
At a minimum, a sovereign state is expected to have three elements: "territory, people, and 
a government." A sovereign state must have de facto supremacy and control (at least in 
some measure) over itS territory and people (the internal component). _That is, the state 
represents the supreme source of authority on internal matters. Additionally, a state must 
exhibit some de facto external independence; "not the supremacy of one state over others 
but the independence of one state from its peers." Id. at 160 (footnotes omitted); see also 
Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 20 ( 1948) (discussing 
the origins of modem sovereignty). However, "there is no expectation that to claim 
sovereignty a state must demonstrate complete satisfaction of all of the underlying 
elements." Ring, supra, at 161. 
5. Another term that is critical to our discussion is, of course, "Indians." When 
Christopher Columbus mad~ landfall on the island of San Salvador in 1492, he called the 
· people he encountered Indians, a common European term for inhabitants of the Far East. 
See HERBERT BAXTER ADAMS & HENRY WOOD, COLUMBUS AND HIS DISCOVERY OF AMERICA 
25 (1892); THEJOURNALOFCHRISTOPHERCOLUMBUS 27 (CecilJane trans., 1960) (1492); 
S. James Anaya, Indian Givers: What Indigenous People Have Contributed to International Human 
Rights Law, 22 WASH. U.J. L. & POL'Y 107, 107 (2006). Even though Columbus was off by 
some 9,000 miles, the name stuck. The term Native American came en vogue in some 
circles during the 1960s and 1970s. Terence Dougherty, Group Rights to Cultural Survival: 
Intellectual Property Rights in Native American Cultural Symbols, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
355, 355 n.l (1998); Whitney Kerr, Giving Up The "!": How the National Museum of the 
American Indian Appropriated Tribal Voices, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 428-29 (2004); Yair 
Listoken, Confronting the Barriers to Native American Homeownership on Tribal Lands: The Case 
of the Navajo Partnership for Housing, 33 URB. LAW. 433, 433 n.3 (2001). However, our 
research shows that the indigenous peoples of this country tend to prefer the traditional 
moniker. DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 9 (5th ed. 2005). See also Robert B. Porter, The 
Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 75, 75 n.l (2002) ("While it has 
become increasingly popular within American society and in some comers of Indian 
country to refer to Indians as 'Native Americans,' this term still seems less utilized among 
Indians than the term 'Indian.' Moreover, use of the term 'Native American' suggests 
acceptance of an unsavory assimilationist connotation."). We abide by that preference in 
this article. 
It must also be noted at the outset that when we speak of things Indian in this paper, we 
speak necessarily in general terms. There are over 300 federally recognized Indian tribes 
in the contiguous United States, each with a unique history, culture, and associated land. 
JAKE PAGE, IN THE HANDS OF THE GREAT SPIRIT: THE 20,000-YEAR HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
INDIANS 2 (2003). It is regrettable to lump these distinct groups into one large (and often 
vague) category - American Indians - but the confines of this paper require as much. See 
GETCHES, WILKINSON, & WILLIAMS, supra, at 9 ("Scholars have observed that 'American 
Indians typically think of themselves as members of a particular tribe first and as Indians 
second.'" (footnote omitted)) When we speak of Indians, then, we mean all federally 
recognized tribes in the continental United States. This excludes unrecognized tribes, 
which lack official sovereignty. We also exclude native Hawaiians and Alaskans. The law 
concerning indigenous Hawaiians and Alaskans is unique: the landscape for native 
Alaskans was changed dramatically with the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, 
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To answer those questions, we devote Part I to discussing 
standing basics, dissecting Massachusetts v. EPA, and making 
conclusions about the case's driving principles. We conclude that 
one of the main reasons states get special solicitude is because they 
have, through federal preemption, lost much of their regulatory 
power. In Part II we discuss the nature and scope of Indian 
sovereignty, canvassing the historical and legal narrative and where 
things stand today. We also note some of the key similarities and 
points of distinction between tribal and state sovereignty. From 
there, we put it all together in Part III, arguing that tribes (as 
sovereign entities) should enjoy the same special solicitude given 
to states in the standing context, particularly in environmental 
cases. We contend that tribes are on the whole better positioned to 
advocate for environmental causes, making the case all the 
stronger for enhanced tribal standing. 
I. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA 
Standing has always played a key role in environmental 
litigation, usually to the chagrin of conservationists.6 But in 2007, 
the Supreme Court altered the law of standing significantly with its 
dedsion in Massachusetts v. EPA. The Court effectively lowered the 
burden on certain types of environmental advocates-sovereign 
plaintiffs. 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28 (Westlaw 2009); see also Jacob T. Levy, Three Perversities of Indian Law, 
12 TEX. REV. OF L. & POL. 329, 332 n.9 (2008), and the government has almost completely 
ignored the rights of native Hawaiians (at present, they lack federal recognition). See Rice 
v. Cayetano 528 U.S. 495, 519 (2000) (saying it would be a "substantial step" to "find[] 
authority in Congress ... to treat Hawaiians or native Hawaiians as tribes," and declining 
to do so); John M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & 
POL'Y REV. 95, 97-98 (1998) ("The Native Hawaiians belong to the only native group in the 
United States that has never been allowed to utilize a claims commission or other 
mechanism to seek redress for its losses from the federal government."). The ideas in this 
paper may well apply to these peoples, but we will not test the reader's patience by delving 
into the nuance. 
6. Joshua J. Bruckerhoff, Giving Nature Constitutional Protection: A Less Anthropocentric 
Interpretation of Environmental Rights, 86 TEX. L. REV. 615, 628 (2008); Robert Stepans, A 
Case for Rancher-Environmentalist Coalitions in Coal Bed Methane Litigation: Preservation of 
Unique Values in an Evolving Landscape, 8 WYO. L. REV. 449, 476 (2008). See generally 
Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Wanning: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 
1 (2005). 
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A. Standing Background 
The text of the Constitution limits federal courts7 to "cases" 
and "controversies."8 From this principle, the Supreme Court has 
divined a number of doctrines to determine whether litigants have 
brought a case appropriate for judicial resolution.9 The Court has 
announced a formal three-part test for constitutional standing, 10 a 
presumption against standing for regulatory beneficiaries, and 
hostility towards generalized grievances-all of which have posed 
fatal obstacles to plaintiffs seeking to redress environmental harms. 
As will be seen below, in Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court 
defined these rules in such a way that a sovereign may invoke the 
federaljudiciary's power when a non-sovereign litigant may not. 
Standing doctrine is typically justified by two theoretical pillars: 
finding a case that fits within a form that matches the traditional 
idea of a case11 and ensuring presentation of the action in a 
properly adversarial manner. 12 The Court has solidified a familiar 
three-part criteria for standing: (1) a concrete and imminent 
injury (2) caused by the challenged action that would (3) likely be 
7. This section does not address standing to proceed in state courts, which are not 
bound by limjts placed by the Constitution on Article III courts. See generally Note, "Trickle 
Down• Constitutional Interpretation: Should Federal Limits on Legislative Conferral of Standing be 
Imported into State Constitutional Law?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (2008). Nevertheless, many 
states have adopted the federal standing test. See id. at 855 n.100; Sierra Club v. Haw. 
Tourism Au th. ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., 59 P.3d 877, 886 (Haw. 2002). Moreover, resort to state 
court is an unsatisfying answer, as some challenges may only be brought in federal court. 
For example, the agency denial challenged in Massachusetts can only be brought in a 
particular federal court-United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(l) (Westlaw 2009). Similarly, challenges to agency action under the 
Administrative Procedures Act may only be brought in federal court. 5 U.S.C. § 702; Fed. 
Nat. Mortg. Ass'n v. LeCrone, 868 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1989); Double LL Contractors v. 
State ex rel. Okla. Dept. ofTransp., 918 P.2d 34, 42 (Okla. 1996). 
8. U.S. Const. art. III. 
9. Among these principles are that Courts will not decide a "political question," issue 
an advisory opinion, or continue with a case after the issue has been mooted by later 
developments. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). · 
10. There is also a line of jurisprudence that establishes prudential, rather than 
Constitutional, limits on standing. Thus, a plaintiff must generally assert his own rights, 
and not those of another individual. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004). A 
plaintiff who asserts only a "generalized grievance" faces dismissal on prudential standing 
grounds, although this also has been treated by the Court as a Constitutional requirement, 
as discussed later. A third type of prudential standing limitation is that the plaintiff should 
assert a claim within the "zone of interest ·protected by the law invoked." Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
l l. Rast, 392 U.S. at 95 (noting that standing limits the Court to cases fitting "a form 
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process"). 
12. Id. (noting the importance of presenting issues "in an adversary context"). 
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redressed by a favorable decision. 13 Proponents of strict limits on 
standing argue that such limits buttress notions of separation of 
powers. 14 Critics complain that the test undervalues injuries, is 
overly formal, and lacks support from history or the Constitution's 
text. 15 Although the details of the standing test, and the extent to 
which Congress may alter the analysis, have varied as the Court has 
been confronted with different factual scenarios, this basic test has 
consistently provided the framework for standing .for decades. 16 
The Court has also articulated a separate presumption against 
standing for individuals who are not the object of the regulation 
(or lack thereof) they seek to challenge. The. Defenders of Wildlife 
Court stated: 
[T] o establish standing depends considerably upon 
whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or 
forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little 
question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, 
and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action 
will redress it. When, however, as in this case, a plaintiffs 
asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly 
unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone 
else, much more is needed. 17 
The consequence of the Court's tripartite approach is the 
creation of a bias against those who would challenge 
underprotection of the environment. Regulations may be 
challenged by regulated industry, but the failure to regulate may 
go unchallenged for want of an adequate plaintiff. Accordingly, 
" [ t] he net effect ofjudicial review of administrative action is highly 
antiregulatory."18 
13. Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
14. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential E/,ement of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 895 (1983). 
15. See Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1665 
(2007) ("Scholars almost unanimously regard it as pointless and incoherent at best, a veil 
for ideological manipulations at worst." (footnotes omitted)). See generally Cass Sunstein, 
Standingfor Animals (with Notes· on Animal Rights), 4 7 UCLA L. REV. 1333, (2000). 
16. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
17. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-62; see also Scalia, supra note 14, at 894 ("Thus, 
when an individual who is the very object of a law's requirement or prohibition seeks to 
challenge it, he always has standing. That is the classic case of the law bearing down upon 
the individual himself...."). 
18. Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for judicial Review ofRulemaking, 85 VA. L. 
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Obviously, then, standing has posed problems for plaintiffs 
seeking to litigate environmental claims. Plaintiffs in 
environmental suits arguably have fared the worst under the 
modern standing doctrine, 19 and it is no coincidence that a 
number of the Supreme Court's pronouncements curtailing 
standing have been in environmental cases. 20 The Court has 
suggested that the federal courts exist '"solely[] to decide on the 
rights of individuals."'21 Environmental harms may fall most 
directly on animals, plants, and ecosystems, while the harms to 
individual humans are often too diffuse or attenuated to support 
standing under the three-part test.22 
Prior to 2007, as a result, standing for plaintiffs who sought to 
litigate global warming issues seemed doubtful. Despite the harms 
that were being suffered,23 cases and commentary noted the 
REV. 1243, 1322 (1999). 
19. Jamie Gibbs Pleune, Is Scalian Standing the Latest Sighting of the Lochner-ess 
Monster?: Using Global Warming to Explare the Myth of the Corporate Person, 38 ENVrL. L. 273, 
281 (2008) ("Environmental injuries do not fare well under Scalian Standing."); see also 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("I cannot join the Court on 
what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental 
standing."). · 
20. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009); Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555; Lujan v. 
Nat'I Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see 
also RICHARD J. LAzARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 134 (2004) ("The Court 
repeatedly ruled against the citizen's ability to maintain environmental protection...."). 
21. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, 528 
U.S. 167, 181 (2000) ("The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing, however, 
is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff."). 
22. As a result, some scholars have suggested bestowing standing on natural objects. 
Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 450, 464-73 (1972); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1336; Katherine A. Burke, 
Comment, Can We Stand for It? Amending the Endangered Species Act with an Animal-Suit 
Provision, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 633 (2004); Adam Kolber, Note, Standing Upright: The Moral 
and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 163 (2001). Indeed, some 
cases have treated animals as if they had standing to sue. See Burke, supra, at 363 n.26; 
Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1359 nn.141-42. 
23. By 2002, the World Health Organization had concluded that climate change 
causes 150,000 deaths per year. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH REPORT 
2002 at 72, available at http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/. Closer to home, "North 
America has experienced locally severe economic damage, plus substantial ecosystem, 
social and cultural disruption from recent weather-related extremes, including hurricanes, 
other severe storms, floods, droughts, heat waves, and wildfires." INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, NORTH AMERICA. CLIMATE CHfu'llGE 2007: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 619 (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapte1·14.pdf; Mini Kaur, 
Note, Global Warming Litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act: What Sosa v. Alvarez Machain 
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difficulty of showing injury to a particular plaintiff.24 Most people 
experienced only "minor and general harms from global 
warming."25 And harm that accrued over fifty to one hundred 
years failed to satisfy the Court's imminence requirement.26 
There was also a belief that causation and redressability posed 
insurmountable obstacles to successfully bringing a climate change 
lawsuit in federal court.27 The geographic distance between the 
greenhouse gas emitter and the environmental harm relied upon 
by the plaintiff made standing highly questionable.28 Proving the 
link between a specific emitter and a particular harm also stood as 
a barrier, particularly in light of what had been perceived to be 
inconclusive evidence.29 Before Massachusetts, the justiciability of 
global warming issues was believed to be unlikely, and then only 
for a limited breed of cases. 30 
B. The Litigation Itself 
Against this backdrop, the petitioners' cause in Massachusetts v. 
EPA seemed destined for failure. The petitioners claimed that auto 
emissions were harming the environment, and EPA needed to do 
something about it. Though they prevailed in the end, the road 
was long and far from obstacle-free.31 It took nearly nine years for 
the issue to travel from a request for rulemaking by a collection of 
non-profit organizations to the Supreme Court's edict. EPA 
originally declined to regulate, and a panel of the D.C. Circuit 
and its Progeny Mean for Indigenous Arctic Communities, 13 WASH. & LEEJ. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. 
JUST. 155, 181 (2006). 
24. Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en bane) 
(denying standing in a global warming suit); Christopher L. Muehlberger, Comment, One 
Man's Conjecture is Another Man's Concrete: Applying the "Injury-in-Fact" Standing Requirement to 
Global Warming; 76 UMKC L. REV. 177, 195-201 (2007) (citing several examples of injuries 
caused by climate change). 
25. Mank, supra note 6, at 82. 
26. Blake R. Bertagna, Comment, "Standing" Up For The Environment: The Ability of 
Plaintiffs to Establish Legal Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 415, 468 (2006). 
27. Muehlberger,· supra note 24, at 185; see also Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 
F.3d at 668-72; Bertagna, supra note 26, at 468. 
28. Bertagna, supra note 26, at 449-50. 
29. Id. at 468. 
30. See id. at 471. 
31. EPA has reconsidered its position and now is working to regulate greenhouse 
gases. See Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (proposed April 24, 
2009). 
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affirmed the denial in a highly fractured opinion. The Supreme 
Court reversed, finding that Massachusetts had standing, and the 
agency erred when it concluded that regulation of greenhouse 
gases was improper. In so doing, the Court announced a rule of 
"special solicitude" weighing in favor of state standing in federal 
court. 
1. Background. 
On October 20, 1999, a number of organizations32 petitioned 
EPA to regulate the emission of carbon dioxide (C02), metqane 
(CH), nitrous oxide (N20), and hydro fluorocarbons (HFCs) 
from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act.33 Fifteen months 
later, EPA requested public comment on the petition and received 
nearly 50,000 comments.34 EPA concluded that it lacked authority 
under the Clean Air Act "to address global climate change" by 
regulating so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs).35 In addition to 
, lack of authority, EPA stated that it "would decline the petitioners' 
request to regulate motor vehicle GHG emissions even if it had 
authority to promulgate such regulations," emphasizing "scientific 
uncertainty" and its pursuit of alternate policy approaches.36 
Twelve states,37 the District of Columbia, American Samoa, two 
cities,38 and fourteen private organizations39 filed a petition for 
32. These organizations were the International Center for Technology Assessment, 
Alliance for Sustainable Communities, Applied Power Technologies, Bio Fuels America, 
California Solar Energy Industries Association, Clements Environmental Corporation, 
Environmental Advocates, Environmental and Energy Study Institute, Friends of the Earth, 
Full Circle Energy Project, Green Party of Rhode Island, Greenpeace USA, Network for 
Environmental and Economic Responsibility of the United Church of Christ, New Jersey 
Environmental Watch, New Mexico Solar Energy Association, Oregon Environmental 
Council, Public Citizen, Solar Energy Industries Association, SUN DAY Campaign. 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 n. 15 (2007). 
33. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. ·Reg. 
52,922, 52,922-52,923 (Sept. 8, 2003) (denial of petition for rulemaking). 
34. Id. at 52,924. 
35. Id. Two general counsel opinions had reached a contrary conclusion shortly 
before the petition was filed. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 510-11. 
36. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.. at 
52,931. 
37. These states were California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. 
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 505 n.2. 
38. The two cities were New York City and Baltimore. Id. at 505 n.3. 
39. The private organizations were Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Food 
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review of EPA'~ denial of the rulemaking request in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.40 Six 
additional states filed an amicus brief at the Supreme Court level 
supporting the petitioners.41 Ten states intervened to support 
EPA's decision,42 and Indiana supported the intervenor states at 
the D.C. Circuit as an amicus. These latter states argued that- EPA 
correctly interpreted the statute, and did not argue .the standing 
issue.43 
2. Supreme Court. 
Although EPA prevailed in the Court of Appeals-as orthodox 
standing jurisprudence would have predicted-the Supreme Court 
reversed. Before it could address the merits, the Court had to find 
that at least one litigant had standing.44 The Court employed a 
Safety, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates, Environmental Defense, 
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, International Center fo~ Technology Assessment, 
National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of 
Concerned Scientists, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group. Id. at 505 n.4. 
40. Challenges to final agency action under the Clean Air Act "may be filed only in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1) 
(Westlaw 2009); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
41. Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, and Wisconsin filed one brief, and 
Delaware filed its own. Brief of Arizona et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2563380; Brief of State of Delaware as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05­
1120), 2006 WL 2569576. 
42. These states were Michigan, Texas, Idaho, North Dakota, Utah, South Dakota, 
Alaska, Kansas, Nebraska, and Ol)io. Brief of Michigan et al., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 
(No. 05-ll20), 2006 WL 3095443. Idaho chose not to join the intervenors" merits briefin 
support of the respondent before the Supreme Court. See id. 
43. Interestingly, the states that wanted agency action were near the coast, with the 
exception of Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, while only Texas and Alaska opposed 
agency action and had ocean coastline. All states that opposed agency action had voted for 
the Republican presidential candidate in 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004, with the exception 
of Michigan and Ohio - both states with heavy automobile industry. One author observed 
that states with hydrocarbon-heavy energy use sided with EPA, while those with a relatively 
low percentage of hydrocarbon energy use sided with the petitioners. Andrew P. Morriss, 
Litigating to Regulate: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2007 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 193, 2ll-l2 (2006-07). 
44. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006)). The Court relied on the rule that 
only one plaintiff/petitioner must have standing to support standing. The full implications 
of this rule have yet to be explored. On the one hand, the rule "makes sense as a matter of 
policy" because there are no adverse consequences to the parties of the rule. Joan 
Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights ofLitigants: What They Are, 
What They Might Be; Part 1: Justiciability and jurisdiction (Original and Appellate), 42 UCLA L. 
REV. 717, 731 ( 1995) .. The costs of defending the suit will likely be constant regardless of 
140 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:130 
two-step analysis to find that Massachusetts had standing. First, it 
noted the status of Massachusetts as a state, rather than an 
ordinary litigant.45 Then, identifying damage to Massachusetts's 
coastline as the harm, it applied the familiar three-part inquiry into 
injury, causation, and redressability. 46 Chief Justice Roberts 
authored a dissent disputing both points.47 
With respect to the first point, the Court afforded the state 
plaintiffs "special solicitude in [the] standing analysis"48 before it 
employed the three-part test-an act, complained the dissent, that 
"change[d] the rules."49 A state is not like an ordinary litigant, the 
majority reasoned, because it has surrendered three "sovereign 
prerogatives" to the federal government: 1) the right to invade 
neighboring territory to prevent harm to its land;50 2) the right to 
negotiate treaties with foreign nations; 51 and 3) the right to 
exercise its police power absent preemption from a higher 
• 52
sovereign. 
Additionally, the Court relied on language from a case from 
1907 brought up by Justice Kennedy during oral argument to 
support this "special solicitude,"-53 and noted that Massachusetts 
sought to "protect[] its quasi-sovereign interests."54 A quasi­
sovereign interest is distinguishable from a sovereign interest, a 
proprietary interest, and a private interest of a state citizen.55 A 
the number of plaintiffs, while the plaintiffs will be bound by res judicata and benefit from 
a positive ruling. See id. Once a plaintiff establishes standing, the Court has jurisdiction 
because it is presented with a case or controversy with adversarial presentation. Moreover, 
the rule comports with the authority courts bestow on individuals to interven~ or file 
amicus briefs to fully vet the issues, even absent usual Article III standing. Yet there could 
be problems if a court fails to clearly delineate between those plaintiffs with standing and 
those without in some circumstances, particularly where a factual dispute presents itself. 
This is especially true if we are to take seriously the clarity-of-the-issues rationale offered 
for standing. 
45. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520. 
46. See id. at 521-26. 
47. Id. at 536-49 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting). 
48. Id. at 520. 
49. Id. at 536 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting). 
50. Id. at 519 (majority opinion) ("Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to 
force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions ...."). 
51. Id. ("[Massachusetts] cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or 
India ... ."). 
52. Id. ("[I]n some circumstances the exercise of [Massachusetts'] police powers ... 
might well be pre-empted."). 
53. Id. at 518 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)). 
54. Id. at 520. 
55. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601-02 
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sovereign interest is the state's interest in governing. Two 
examples of this interest are the state's interest in the recognition 
of its borders and the validity of its legal code.56 A proprietary 
interest is the state's interest as a landowner, for example.57 When 
the state pursues the interests of another party "only for the sake of 
the real party in interest," it is acting only as a nominal party.58 No 
sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated. The essence 
of a quasi-sovereign interest, on the other hand, is when the state 
seeks to assert the rights of its citizens as well as its own "interest[] . 
. . in the well-being of its populace."59 In such a case, the state may 
proceed parens patriae, an ancient doctrine literally meaning 
"parent of the country."60 
Having made much of the fact that Massachusetts is a state, the 
Court nevertheless chose to apply the traditional three-part test 
without again explicitly referencing the special status of the 
petitioner.61 Indeed, the dissent criticized the rule by stating, "It is 
not at all clear how the Court's 'special solicitude' for 
Massachusetts plays out in the standing analysis, except as an 
implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing on 
traditional terms."62 Yet the majority did not address whether 
Massachusetts could have established standing as a private litigant. 
Instead, it appears that the Court found that Massachusetts with 
"special solicitude" had standing, and therefore did not need to 
address whether it would qualify for standing without a sovereign 
boost.63 
Turning to the injury, the Court identified the relevant harm as 
that to Massachusetts's coastline, and noted that the state was 
"alleg[ing] a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner."64 
(1982) (contrasting the various types of interests). 
56. Id. at 601. 
57. Id. at 601-02. 
58. Id. at 602. 
59. Id. 
60. Sara Zdeb, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA: Parens 
Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96 GEO. LJ. 1059, 1068 (2008). 
61. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521-26. 
62. Id. at 540. 
63. See id. at 521 (majority opinion); Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater 
Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 
WM. & MARYL. REV. 1701, 1730 (2008) [hereinafter "Mank, Standing']. 
64. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522. The Court found that Massachusetts '"owns a 
substantial portion of the state's coastal property.'" Id. (quoting Karst Hoogebloom Deel. 
at ~ 4, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 2569818). 
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The dissent was quick to observe that this injury as a landowner was 
a proprietary interest, not a quasi-sovereign one, and provided no 
support for the Court's "special solicitude" rule. 65 The uncontested 
affidavits submitted by Massachusetts asserted that rising sea levels 
had already begun to decrease its coastline,66 and this problem 
would worsen "over the course of the next century."67 The dissent 
argued that Massachusetts's injury was not particularized, in that 
global warming affects everyone. The state's loss of its coastal land 
was an injury it possessed uniquely, responded the majority.68 
Because EPA conceded the link between human-caused 
greenhouse gases and global warming, the majority assumed the 
connection between the United States transportation sector and 
global warming harms.69 The Court reasoned that the emissions 
from the United States play an incremental part in global 
warming, even if only a small one.70 As a corollary, regulating 
Actually, during oral argument counsel noted that the state owns two hundred miles of 
coastline, which turns out to be just over thirteen percent of the state's l,500 miles of 
coastline. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) 
(No. 05-ll20), 2006 WL 3431932. 
65. Id. at 539 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting); see also Karl S. Coplan, Direct Environmental 
Standing for Chartered Conservation Corporations, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 183, 212 
(2001). 
66. · Although the ChiefJustice identified a total of forty-three declarations in support 
of standing, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 542, the petitioners relied on two in front of the 
Supreme Court: the declaration of Michael MacCracken, former senior scientist at the 
Office of the U. S. Global Change Research Program, and that of Michael Walsh, a 
mechanical engineer. Both MacCracken and Walsh concluded that regulatory action 
would cause a reduction in automobile emissions in the United States, and the technology 
developed would spread to other countries, reducing their emissions as well. McCracken 
Deel. at 'l[ 32, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-ll20), 2006 WL 2569818; 
Walsh Deel. at 'l[ 12, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-ll20), 2006 WL 
2569818. MacCracken explained that the United States was responsible for approximately 
twenty-two percent of the world's fossil fuel emissions during the 1990s, with the United 
States transportation sector accounting for thirty-two percent of that, or approximately 
seven percent of world-wide emissions. MacCracken Deel. at 'l[ 31. As a result of global 
warming, MacCracken declared, sea levels have risen between four and eight inches 
during the twentieth century, with a likely additional eight to twenty-eight inch rise by 
2100. Id. at 'l[ 23. 
67. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523. 
68. Id. at 522-23. 
69. In what through the lens of hindsight looks like strategic error, the agency chose 
to accept as true the experts' opinions, arguing that such allegations were insufficient as a. 
matter of law. Nevertheless, the dissent still dismissed the declarations as "pure 
conjecture," and "conclusory." Id. at 542, 546. Similarly, Judge Randolph at the lower court 
buttressed his skepticism for the petitioners' claims by noting that the administrative 
record "contradict[ed]" their assertions and stating that they simply had not proved their 
allegations. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Randolph,].). 
70. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524. 
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carbon dioxide emissions would "reduce[] to some extent," 
perhaps a very small extent, the harm to Massachusetts's 
coastline.71 In the end, then, the test for standing was satisfied with 
the aid of special solicitude: Massachusetts suffered an injury; the 
harm was caused by emissions; and EPA regulation would mitigate 
the harm.72 · 
Given the varying rationales employed by the Court, the weight 
that "special solicitude" plays in the analysis remains unclear.73 
Some have suggested that Massachusetts would have satisfied the 
standing test for an ordinary litigant.74 Yet by emphasizing 
Massachusetts' status as a sovereign, the Court chose not to reach 
that thornier issue, and adopted instead a rule providing states 
with "special solicitude."75 Lower courts have rested on the 
sovereignty aspect of the decision, granting special solicitude to 
sovereigns76 and denying it to non-sovereigns.77 The clearest 
lesson-and most dramatic holding-of the decision is that 
sovereignty matters to the standing analysis in the future. 
71. Id. at 526. 
72. The ultimate merits of the standing analysis need not distract us for long, as the 
decision is the law of the land unless the Supreme Court revisits it; however, it is worth 
noting that commentators have on balance supported the decision. See Mank, Standing, 
supra note 63, at 1785; Zdeb, supra note 60, at 1082. Apart from standing, the other key 
issue was of course EPA's treatment of greenhouse gasses-the merits of the case. On that 
score, the Court decided that the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse 
gases, and the agency erred in declining to regulate them. This conclusion was disputed in 
a dissent penned by Justice Scalia. This portion of the holding has been debated by other 
scholars, and is not important for the arguments made in this article. 
73. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, ·70 ("The multiple bases for standing identified in the 
Court's opinion produce a great deal of uncertainty. It is not clear which if any 
components of the Court's standing analysis will generalize beyond this case."); Mank, 
Standing, supra note 63, at 1746, 1755. 
74. Michael Sugar, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 3l HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 531, 542 (2007) ("[I]t is unclear how "special solicitude" operates in this case 
because Massachusetts has standing under the Defenders of Wildlife test as traditionally 
applied."); see also Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 433, 468 (2008) ("Would the same result.have been obtained for an individual? Or 
a public interest organization?"), · 
75. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520. 
76. Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008). 
77. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat'! Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1294 n.2 
(D.C. Cir. 2007). One case declined to extend special solicitude to foreign nations, 
reasoning that a foreign nation's sovereign prerogatives were not lodged in the United 
States government. Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). That case expressly noted that Indian tribes were distinguishable from 
foreign nations on that ground. Id. 
144 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:130 
Digging deeper, the Court expressly relied on preemption­
displacement of state law by federal law-and we believe that this, 
more than any other factor, helps explain the rationale for the 
decision. The Court identified as a sovereign interest the state's 
interest in having regulations cover its territory-an interest that is 
not always protected by today's legal rules. 78 Congress's authority to 
legislate under the Commerce Clause is expansive, and delegation 
of that authority to agencies is .almost expected. Preemption 
clauses are commonplace in statutes, and even in a silent statute 
"inconsistent" state laws are declared void by the courts. 79 Even 
agencies have the authority to preempt state laws.80 Moreover, with 
the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment,81 states lost a large 
part of their political influence over Congress.82 
In addition to the traditionally understood injuries, courts have 
recognized that states may suffer an injury in the form of 
preemption of their laws.83 This is generally identified as the 
relevant injury for purposes of satisfying the three-part standing 
framework. 84 This is consistent with the way the Supreme Court has 
recognized the harm that preemption can cause a state. For 
78. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). The significance to the special 
solicitude test of a sovereign interest in avoiding preemption was emphasized in an online 
companion to the Northwestern University Law Review. Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. 
Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than Global Wanning, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2007). 
79. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Geier v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000). 
80. See generally, Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 
(2004). 
81. "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each 
state, elected by the people thereof ...."U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
82. Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Supreme 
Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671, 680-87 (1999); Todd J. 
Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its 
Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 169-75 (1997). Yet one 
article implies criticism because states have greater legislative input than ordinary citizens 
because "surely the states can spur legislative oversight of a recalcitrant EPA by enlisting 
sympathetic members of their congressional delegations to hold hearings or otherwise 
make life difficult for the agency." Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 73, at 68. 
83. Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 47iU.S. 41, 50 n.17 
(1986); Tex. Office of Pub. Utility Counsel v. F.C.C., 183 F.3d 393, 449 (5th Cir. 1999); Ill. 
Dept. of Transp. v. Hinson, 122 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1997); Alaska v. U.S. Dept. of 
Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. U.S. Dept. of 
Transp., 766 F.2d 228, 232-33 (6th Cir. 1985). But see Amicus Br. of Arizona at *23, 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120) (stating that the Supreme Court 
never expressly adopted this theory). 
84. Alaska, 868 F.2d 441, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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example, the Supreme Court has articulated as a sovereign interest 
the validity of one's legal code.B5 Similarly, the harm visited by 
preemption has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court with its 
creation of the "presumption against preemption" doctrine.B6 
Implicitly the Court recognizes that the harm of preemption is so 
great that statutes will be construed when possible to limit the 
· existence and scope of preemption. 
Here, it can be admitted, Massachusetts's injury was not simply 
preemption. Nor was it simply the loss of coastline. It was both of 
these harms together that created a cognizable injury. Absent 
preemption, Massachusetts was free to address any perceived harm 
through the exercise of its general police power, circumscribed 
only by limitations imposed by the electorate and the Constitution. 
With preemption, the concerns of Massachusetts could only be 
answered by EPA, and Massachusetts's power for resolving the 
problem was now "lodged in the Federal Government"B7-the same 
federal government choosing not to address the problem. Under 
the special solicitude rule, the types of injury sufficient to permit 
standing are likely expanded. Environmental harms that were 
previously dismissed as insufficient or inconclusive, when 
aggregated with the state's sovereign desire for regulation and the 
incentives of the Clean Air Act, are now capable of supporting 
standing. 
In the context of environmental regulation, . moreover, 
recogmt10n of preemption is critical. Environmental statutes are 
particularly susceptible to broad preemption clauses, as such 
preemption is often needed to satisfy industry and lower costs 
through national uniformity.BB The Clean Air Act in particular. 
recognizes this compromise, containing a broad preemption 
clause preventing states from regulating automobile emissions.B9 
85. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982). 
86. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005); Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lqhr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
87. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). 
88. See Jessica L. Powers, Comment, Reduce Reuse, Resort to Litigation: Global Warming 
Lawsuits and What they Mean for Texas, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 123, 14 7 n.263 (2007). 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (Westlaw 2009) ("No State or any political subdivision 
thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions 
from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part."). In light of 
the definition of "emission standard" that applies only to the emission of "air pollutants," 
42 U.S.C. § 7602(k) (Westlaw 2009), states relied on EPA's conclusion that greenhouse 
gases were not "air pollutants," and therefore argued that their regulations of automobile 
emissions were not preempted. See Cent. Valley Chrysler:Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 
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C. Sovereignty and Standing after Massachusetts 
Under Massachusetts, the sovereignty of the litigant alters the 
standing test in four notable ways: a) the purposes served by 
standing predominate over the strictures of the formal test; b) 
harms to quasi-sovereign inte~ests count as injuries for purposes of 
standing; c) generalized grievances are more likely to be tolerated 
when the plaintiff is a sovereign; and d) deference will be given to 
the sovereign's factual assessments. Each of these alterations 
proves that sovereignty is critical to the standing analysis.90 
2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2006). This argument is clearly foreclosed by Massachusetts's .holding 
that greenhouse gases are air pollutants. However, another district court found Vermont's 
greenhouse gas regulations were not preempted by the Clean Air Act when a waiver has 
been issued. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 
295 (D.Vt. 2007). See generally Kevin .o. Leske, A Closer Look at Green Mountain Chrysler v. 
Crombie, 32 VT. L. REV. 439 (2008). The law permits EPA to grant a waiver of this 
preemptive section to California and other states that have adopted California's standards, 
although EPA indicated that it would deny the waiver in 2008 for the first time. See Margot 
Roosevelt, EPA Justifies Denial of Waiver for California, LA TIMES, Mar. 1, 2008. A state does 
not have a preemptive injury when their regulations are saved from preemption. See Tex. 
Office of Pub. Utility Counsel v. F.C.C., 183 F.3d 393, 419 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
state cannot assert a sovereign interest as injury when it possesses veto power over federal 
regulation). Once President Obama took office, however, he ordered EPA to reconsider 
that decision. Ken Bensinger & Jim Tankersley, Obama Moves to Force Automakers to Produce 
More Fuel-efficient Vehicles, LA TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009. 
90. Some have emphasized the procedural rights aspect of Massachusetts. La. Envtl. 
Action Network v. McDaniel, No. 06-4161, 2008 WL 803407, at *3 (E.D.La. Mar. 12, 2008). 
Yet the case does not fit neatly within the relaxed standing afforded to plaintiffs asserting a 
procedural right. The paradigmatic procedural injury case is one brought under NEPA 
challenging the failure to create an Environmental Impact Statement. E.g. Citizens for 
Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 970 (9th Cir. 2003); Comm. to Save 
the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 448 (10th Cir. 1996); Fla. Audubon Soc. v. 
Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en bane). See generally Zachary D. Sakas, 
Footnotes, Forests, And Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit Split Regarding Standing in 
Procedural Injury-Based Programmatic Challenges, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 175 (2006). NEPA 
however, is a law that is vigorously non-substantive. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, 
Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. 
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (noting that NEPA imposes "essentially procedural" 
duties). The relaxed standard has occasionally been applied to statutory challenges 
beyond NEPA when those statutes' procedural requirements can be "likened ... to those 
required under NEPA." Randall S. Abate & Michael J. Myers, Broadening the Scope of 
Environmental Standing: Procedural and Informational Injury-in-Fact After Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 12 UCLA]. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 345, 378 (1994). But it doesn't provide any help if 
you want to challenge the substance of an agency decision. See, e.g., Nat'! Parks 
Conservation Ass'n v. Manson, 414 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that failure to 
prepare EIS is typical procedural injury and contrasting arbitrary and capricious review 
with allegations of procedural injury); Kristen M. Shults, Comment, Friends of the Earth v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services: A Resounding Victory for Environmentalists, Its Implications on 
Futurejusticiability Decisions, and Resolution ofIssues on Remand, 89 GEO. LJ. 1001, 1010 n.56 
(2001). Massachusetts was disputing the merits of the agency's decision, seeking 
147 2010] EQUAL STANDING WITH STATES 
First, the Supreme Court signaled that the purposes of 
standing should be salient when considering a sovereign litigant. 
Although it applied the traditional three-part test, the Supreme 
Court departed from past practice and focused on whether the 
goals of standing-ensuring zealous advocacy and a crystallized 
dispute-would be satisfied by M.assachusetts's suit.91 The majority 
emphasized that Massachusetts's dual status as a sovereign and 
landowner "reinforce[d] the conclusion that its stake in the 
outcome [wa]s sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of 
federal judicial power,"92 and concluded that the state would 
vigorously prosecute its interest.93 
Additionally, we believe that the presence of a sovereign alters 
the separation-of-powers calculus that drove the Supreme Court to 
curtail private litigant standing. A state that commences a lawsuit is 
more .than simply the ideological intermeddler that worries 
courts.94 The concerns prompting the Court to disapprove of 
ideological plaintiffs, such as the potential for manipulation95 and 
opening the floodgates of litigation,96 are simply not present with 
substantive review. See Bertagna, supra note 26, at 433. 
91. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). As commentators love to point 
out, these concerns are conspicuously absent from the formalistic test developed. Jonathan 
R. Siegel, A Theory of]usticiability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 89 (2007) ("[SJ tanding doctrine does 
not bear any necessary relationship to vigorous advocacy. Nor does it even serve as a 
suitable, if rough, proxy for the practical likelihood that a plaintiff will do a good job of 
illuminating issues for the courts...."). 
92. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519. 
93. See id: at 521. 
94. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Found. on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 
794 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.D.C. 1992) ("The purpose of [the three-part test] is to ensure 
that the judicial power exercised by federal judges remains confined to the adjudication of 
particular 'cases' and 'controversies,' as set forth in Article III, and not extended to the 
resolution of disputes by litigants with no more than an ideological interest in a problem, 
no matter how deeply that interest may be held."). 
95. See Maxwell L. Steams, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model ofEnvironmental 
Standing, 11 DUKE ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 321, 334 n.34 (2001) ("Absent standing, 
ideological interest groups could manipulate circuit splits as a means to effectively force 
the grant of certiorari, rendering docket control illusory."). 
96. See Laura L. Little, It's About Time: Unravelling Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 41 
BUFF. L. REV. 933, 965 (1993); c.f Allen, 468 U.S. at 756 (complaining that ideological 
harm could permit "all members of the particular racial group[]" to sue, including "[a] 
black person in Hawaii [who] could challenge the grant of a tax exemption to a racially 
discriminatory school in Maine"); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) 
(Powell, J., concurring) ("Quite apart from this possibility, we risk a progressive 
impairment of the effectiveness of the federal courts if their limited resources are diverted 
increasingly from their historic role to the resolution of public-interest suits brought by 
litigants who cannot distinguish themselves from all taxpayers or all citizens."). 
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challenges like Massachusetts's. Budgetary constraints97 and 
political accountability98 protect against intervention based on 
whimsy or a desire to manipulate. And the courts need not worry 
about being inundated with lawsuits, as there are relatively few 
state.s, and no indication that these states are eager plaintiffs.99 
States' legendary lack of resources assures courts that the few 
sovereigns entitled to invoke special solicitude will not frequently 
or arbitrarily do so. 100 
The nature of a sovereign is such that "generalized grievances" 
in particular may survive under a special solicitude test. The 
disagreement between the justices reflects a more general tension 
in the case law whether and when a grievance fails simply because 
it is widely shared, and whether this rule derives from prudential 
considerations or is mandated by the Constitution.101 The majority 
was able to sidestep resolving these tensions. The Court was not 
dealing with an ordinary private litigant, but with a sovereign 
capable of asserting the rights of many people. The very nature of 
the parens patriae action is a generalized grievance and the purpose 
of the action is to vindicate public rights too diffuse to support 
individual standing. 102 Environmental litigation has been plagued 
with the difficulties of overcoming . the generalized grievance 
doctrine; Massachusetts v. EPA may change that. 103 The end result: 
97. Mank, Standing, supra note 63, at 1781-82. 
98. Id. at 1783 (noting that forty-three states have elected attorneys general). 
99. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 548 (2007) (Roberts, CJ, dissenting) 
("The good news is that the Court's 'special solicitude' for Massachusetts limits the future 
applicability of the diluted standing requirements applied in this case."). The number of 
cases brought by states has historically been small, but may be increasing in number. Amy 
J. Wildermuth, VVhy State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 273, 287 & nn.123-24 (2007) (collecting cases). Of course, the courts' concern 
with a flood of litigation is not necessarily well-founded, as "the experience of various 
states permitting taxpayer and even citizen suits casts doubt on the proposition that the 
courts will be swamped by litigation if private parties are not subject to standing limitations 
of some kind." John C. Reitz, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, 50 AM.]: COMP. L. 437, 
454-55 (2002). 
100. Mank, Standing, supra note 63, at 1781-82. 
101. See generally Mark Gabel, Note, Generalized Grievances and judicial Discretion, 58 
HAsTINGSL.J. 1331 (2007). 
102. Zdeb, supra note 60, at 1077. The fact that criminal prosecutions are permitted 
in federal court defeats the idea that the Constitution prohibits a sovereign from enforcing 
public rights. See generally Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal 
Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine is Lookingfor- Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 2239 (1999). 
103. Whether environmental harms fall within the generalized grievance doctrine is 
questionable. Environmental harms, it could be argued, are more similar to a mass tort 
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given their sovereign status, states now play an expanded role in 
litigating climate change issues in federal court. 
Finally, "special solicitude," indicates deference to the state's 
factual concerns. Massachusetts believed that it was suffering harm 
and that regulation of tailpipe emissions would solve the harm. It 
could not employ its sovereign prerogative and regulate, as it 
normally would, because its power has been preempted in this 
area. Therefore, it was forced to ask the Court to compel the 
agency charged with this responsibility to comply with federal law. 
The Court was reluctant to substitute its belief on the state of the 
world for Massachusetts's, with Massachusetts having made a 
reasoned judgment that the harm was significant, imminent, 
caused by emissions, and likely to be redressed with EPA 
regulation. Absent preemption, Massachusetts could determine 
facts about the world and act accordingly-and "empirical debates 
over the wisdom of [legislation] are not to be carried out in the 
federal courts."104 With preemption, the standing doctrine puts 
courts in the situation of second-guessing a state's rational 
concerns about injury, beliefs as to causation, and convictions as to 
redressability that otherwise would be addressed through the 
democratic process within the state. "Special solicitude" removes 
this burden from the federal courts and returns it to the states. 105 
Thus, in undertaking the standing inquiry, courts will defer more 
to the factual assessments by sovereigns than they do to private 
litigants. 
II. IND°IAN SOVEREIGNTY: ITS NATURE AND SCOPE 
But do Indian tribes get the benefits of "special solicitude" to 
the same extent as states? We think they ought to-at least in the 
environmental context-but before making that claim, we must 
examine the nature of tribal sovereignty in some detail. The 
Supreme Court gave Massachusetts a boost in the standing analysis 
than the cases where every citizen suffers precisely the same injury. See Covington v. 
Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 651-52 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould,]., concurring). Moreover, 
"even more broadly distributed environmental harms are likely to have a disproportionate 
impact on the poor," and a growing body of literature identifies the uniquely severe harms 
experienced in tribal communities. Amy Sinden, In Defense ofAbsolutes: Combating the Politics 
ofPower in Environmental Law, 90 IOWAL. REV. 1405, 1453 (2005). 
104. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984). 
105. This isn't to say that complete deference is warranted. But when faced with a 
close call, the Court chose to lessen the showing that a sovereign must make to establish 
standing. 
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("special solicitude") on account of its sovereign nature. If Indian 
tribes hope to benefit from this same solicitude, they will need to 
demonstrate tbat they are, if not the equals of states in terms of 
sovereignty, not far behind. If tribes are not meaningfully 
sovereign, in other words, our argument has no legs. 
Sovereignty has been called the "most commanding concept in 
all of Indian law."106 In its generic sense, the term sovereignty 
implies autonomous political power. 107 However, sovereignty for 
tribes has usually fallen somewhat short. Tribes have never been 
placed on an equal footing with the federal government or foreign 
nations. Neither have domestic states, though, and we all consider 
them sovereign to one degree or another. _So what does 
sovereignty mean for tribes? 
A. History 
Answering that question demands a look to history. During the 
colonial era, European powers and their American agents treated 
Indian tribes as land-holders in name yet little more than 
occupants in sub_stance. "The European nations presumed an 
exclusive right to deal with and extinguish the Indians' land 
titles."108 But this does not mean the conquering forces recognized 
no rules at all. In contrast to some of the Spanish conquistadores in 
Latin America who took the position that native land was theirs by 
divine right, 109 the British and French in North America accorded a 
106. WILLIAM H. RODGERS,JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY 5 (2007). 
107. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000) 
(describing sovereignty variously as "supremacy of authority or rule as exercised by a 
sovereign or sovereign state," "complete independence and self-government," and "a 
territory existing as an independent state"); see also Ring, supra note 4, at 160 ("At a 
minimum, a sovereign state is expected to have three elements: "territory, people, and a 
government."). 
108. GETCHES, WILKINSON, & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 3. 
109. See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, No Other Gods Before Me: Spheres of Influence in the 
Relationship Between Christianity and Islam, 33 DENV.J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y 223, 269 (2005). 
Gartenstein-Ross describes the Spanish approach like this: 
The early Spanish conquistadors arrived in the Americas armed with the 
Requerimiento (requirement), which they would read to the natives upon 
encountering them. The Requerimiento explained that the Pope, God's earthly 
representative, had granted the natives' land to the king of Spain, and that the 
natives should recognize the authority of the Pope and Spanish crown or else 
"with the help of God we shall ·forcefully enter your country and shall make war 
against you in all ways ...that we can." 
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semblance of sovereignty to the tribes they "discovered." Though 
the practice was not uniform, the British and French would 
routinely make treaties with Indian tribes, thereby tacitly 
acknowledging their status as sovereign peoples. 110 At the same 
time, however, it was clear from the start that the European 
nations viewed their native counterparts as lesser sovereigns. 
Limiting the role of sovereignty was the notion of dependence. 
As European settlers displaced natives and decimated their 
numbers, it became plain that Indians were, in a practical sense at 
least, dealing with stronger sovereigns. 111 Out of self-interest more 
than anything else, European discoverers would offer tribes 
protection from other colonizing forces. "The colonizing forces, 
and later the United States, agreed to continue such protection in 
return for the Indians' pledges of peace and fealty." 112 
During westward expansion the practice of negotiating treaties 
with Indian tribes flourished.u 3 The federal government (the 
Id. (quoting DAVID H, GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW: CAsES AND MATERIALS 48-49 (3d ed. 1993)). Portugal was no less extreme in 
its claim of religious entitlement. See id. This is not to suggest, however, that England and 
France were much more "civilized" in their approach to native peoples. Rather, it is only 
to state that the Anglo-Franco approach was different-if no less unjust-and that 
difference would bear legal consequences down the road. 
110. Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of 'Domestic Dependent Nations' in the· 
Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005 
UTAH L. REV. 443, 457-58. 
111. See Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, The Effect ofjudicial Independence on Courts: 
Evidence from the American States, 35J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 432 (2006) ("In practice, decimated 
by disease, given lower status than white colonists, and having had their land taken with 
little or no compensation, the Native Americans were not in any position to influence the 
evolution of the state legal system.") 
112. GETCHES, WILKINSON, & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 3. However, for a short time 
after the Revolutionary War, the United States considered the tribes aligned with the 
British "conquered nations." This approach implied automatic transfer of title, but it was 
short-lived. See Scott A. Taylor, The Native American Law Opinions ofjudge Noonan: Do We 
Hear the Faint Voice ofBartolome de las Casas?, 1 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 148, 159 (2003) 
113. See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and 
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 200 (1984). Once again, the choice to make treaties was 
driven largely by utilitarian concerns: 
In formulating federal policy toward Indian tribes in the early years of the 
Constitution, President Washington and Secretary of War Knox followed the 
policy promulgated by the British Crown-though not always followed by 
individual colonies-of dealing with Indian tribes as .sovereign nations. Their 
principal reason was practical: earlier attempts by individual colonies and some 
states under the Articles of Confederation to assert power over Indian tribes, 
especially power to seize tribal lands, had caused conflicts. According to one 
historian, "[t]he country, precariously perched among the sovereign nations of 
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Constitution denied states this power) signed treaties securing 
large swaths of tribal land for white settlement. 114 The deals were 
less than arms-length transactions. 115 Federal authorities had the 
tribes between a rock and a hard place: they could do nothing to 
stop the wagon trains rolling across the western plains, so they 
claimed, and unless the tribes wanted to fight a futile battle and 
lose all their land in the process, they had better cede most (but 
not_ all) of their holdings peacefully. 116 With some notable 
the world, could not stand the expense and strain of a long drawn-out Indian 
war." 
Id. (quoting FRANCIS PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 44 
(1962)) (footnotes omitted). 
114. See, e.g., Howard J. Vogel, Healing the Trauma of America's Past: Restorative justice, 
Honest Patriotism, and the Legacy of Ethnic Cl.eansing, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 981, 994-95 (2007) 
(discussing the land cession treaties struck between the Dakota and the United States in 
the mid-1800s.). 
115. See, e.g., id. at 994 ("Most notorious among the land cession treaties were the 
two 'negotiated' in 1851 through a 'monstrous conspiracy' at Traverse des Sioux and 
Mendota .... Under these treaties, twenty-four million acres were ceded to the United 
States ....) (footnote omitted). 
116. See John E. Thorson, Ramsey Laursoo Kropf, Dar Crammond, & Andrea K 
Gerlak, Dividing Western Waters: A Century ofAdjudicating Rivers and Streams, 8 DEN. WATER L. 
REV. 355, 372 (2005) ("The United States gave tribes a choice of sorts: keep the homeland 
and be overrun by white settlement, or move west."). One way or another, the United 
States government was going to stake out its territory from sea to shining sea. The push to 
the Pacific, under the banner of "manifest destiny," is the stuff of books, and so are the 
sufferings of Indians cast aside along the way. For a time, things looked relatively bright for 
the western tribes. Andrew Jackson, known to the eastern tribes as "Sharp Knife," 
convinced Congress to create a "permanent Indian frontier" in the early 1830s "setting 
apart an ample district west of the Mississippi ... to be guaranteed to the Indian tribes, as 
long as they shall occupy it." DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 5-6 (1970) (internal quotations omitted). Shortly after 
the permanent frontier was created, however, white men moving into the territories of 
Wisconsin and Iowa led the government to shift the frontier line from the Mississippi to 
the 95th meridian. Id. at 6. This would be the first of many such westward adjustments. 
When gold was discovered in California in 1848 (on the heels of U.S. acquisition of that 
territory by way of the Mexican-American War), easterners flocked to the West Coast by 
the thousands, driving through Indian Territory along the way and often taking up 
residence there. Id. at 8. This was not supposed to happen according to the laws creating 
the permanent frontier. White persons were to be prohibited from settling in Indian 
Territory, they were not to trade in that land without a license, and, in fact, the U.S. 
military established forts along the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers to police these lines. Id. 
at 6. But the gold rush and the desire fqr expansion were forces too tough to resist. White 
men were taking over Indian Territory, and the federal government was alright with that. 
It was, after all, the nation's "manifest destiny." Dee Brown is skeptical: 
To justify these breaches of the "permanent Indian frontier," the policy 
makers in Washington invented "Manifest Destiny," a term which lifted land 
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exceptions,117 the tribes capitulated. And they held on over the 
years more or less at the whim of the federal government. It was no 
misstatement, therefore, when the Supreme Court explained in 
1978 that Indian tribes had lost some of their sovereignty "by virtue 
of their dependent status."118 
Of course, tribes weren't always so "dependent." They 
acquired that status through a campaign of warfare, deception, 
and legal fiction, and we should question whether sovereignty can 
be legitimately diminished in this manner. 119 It is one thing if a 
people agree to compromise their sovereignty through a non­
coercive accord (like agreeing to cede a sector of jurisdiction to 
the International Criminal Court120 ) or if a people are stripped of 
hunger to a lofty plane. The Europeans and their descendants were ordained by 
destiny to rule all of America. They were the dominant race and therefore 
responsible for the Indians-along with their lands, their forests, and their 
mineral wealth. Only the New Englanders, who had destroyed or driven out all 
their Indians, spoke against Manifest Destiny. 
Id. at 8. 
117. The Chiricahua Apache, led by Geronimo, held out against the federal 
government for over twenty-five years. BRITTON DAVIS, THE TRUTH ABOUT GERONIMO 207­
10 (1976) 
118. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). 
119. Professor William Bradford suggests as much in his article calling for Indian 
independence. See William Bradford, ''Another Such Victory and We Are Undone": A Call to an 
American Indian Declaration of Independence, 40 TULSA L. REV. 71, 74-88 (2004) (chronicling 
the "destruction" of tribal sovereignty by federal Indian law). As Bradford sees it, the 
reasons for the diminishment of tribal sovereignty were as base they get: 
Respect for mutual sovereignty, however, collapsed under the weight of white 
land hunger ai'id burgeoning U.S. military capacity. Although prudence 
restrained U.S. aggression in the early decades of the republic, by the nineteenth 
century a majority of the U.S. population regarded the presumption of Indian 
sovereignty under international and domestic law as an obstacle to white notions 
of progress. It fell to federal Indian law to legitimate the violent expropriation 
of Indian lands and the destruction of rival polities within what would become 
the boundaries of the United States. 
Id. at 77 (footnote omitted). 
i20. See Book Review, The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court, 12 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. LJ. 275, 276 (2009) (stating that "the notion of state sovereignty 
[w]as the key reason why earlier discussions of establishing an international criminal 
tribunal failed to lead to a permanent court like the ICC"); id. at 280 ("States' willingness 
to reduce their own sovereignty in deference to the ICC is not only grounded in the 
complementary nature of its jurisdiction but also in its permanence."); Karen J. Alter, 
Delegating to International Courts: SelfBinding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 71 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 37, 73 (2008) (discussing the "sovereignty costs" of delegation to international 
courts). 
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some their sovereignty through a ''.just war" (the example of post­
World War II Germany comes to mind121 ). But it is entirely 
different if a people are coerced into ceding their sovereignty 
through trickery and deceit, or stripped of it through urtjust 
warfare, as was the case for the American Indians. 122 The Supreme 
Court has often taken the view that tribal sovereignty is diminished 
sovereignty without questioning how that came to be or, more 
importantly, whether that process of diminishment was legitimate. 
These are questions the Court should examine. When they are 
considered, the limitations of tribal sovereignty lose credibility. 
121. See Michael J. Kelly, Political Downsizing: The Re-emergence of Self Determination, and 
the Movement Toward Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous States, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 209, 264 ("The 
post-World War II era saw ... the formal occupation of all of Germany for forty-five years . 
. . . It was not until 1990 that a treaty was signed terminating the occupation and granting 
Germany 'full sovereignty over its external and internal affairs.'") (footnote omitted). See 
also Robert J. Delahunty, The Batt/,e of Mars and Venus: Why Do American and European 
Attitudes Toward International Law Differ, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 11, 27 (2006) 
(commenting on the decline of nationalism and the importance of sovereignty in post­
World War II Europe, particularly in Germany). Delahunty asserts that 
The end of the Second World War Jed to the decline of nationalism all over 
Western Europe, but above all in Germany. As Russell Hittinger puts the point, 
"In 1945, after two world wars, the crown jewel of modernity-the sovereign 
nation state-was brought before the bar of moral judgment. The Protestant 
theologian, Karl Barth aptly called this the era of 'disillusioned sovereignty.' ... 
While the post-War phenomenon of the erosion of national feeling and national 
sovereignty has by no means been confined to Europe, it has been felt unusually 
keenly there. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
122. Wars of conquest cannot be, under any accepted definition, 'just wars." See 
Major Jennifer B. Bottoms, When Close Doesn't Count: An Analysis of Israel's ]us ad Bellum and 
]us in Bello in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War, 2009 (April) ARMY LAWYER 23, 27-30 (discussing 
classic definitions ofjust war theory from Cicero, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas). 
A 'just war" requires, first and foremost, a just case, such as self-defense, recovering stolen 
goods or property, avenging a wrong, or taking action against a nation where that nation 
has refused to address a wrong committed by one of its citizens. Id.; see also Carsten Stahn, 
]us Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s), 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 311, 336 (2008) 
(explaining that "classical principles ofjust war theory" include 'just cause, right intention, 
public declaration, legitimate authority, discrimination and proportionality"). Conquest 
and expansion for their own sake do not cut it. See Michael Walzer, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 
xi (2004) ("Aggressive wars, wars of conquest, wars to extend spheres of influence and 
establish satellite states, wars for economic aggrandizement-all these are unjust wars.") 
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· B. The Law 
1. The Marshall Trilogy. 
The law concerning Indian sovereignty more or less tracked 
the historical narrative. Many of the fundamental principles 
underlying Indian law were framed by ChiefJustice John Marshall. 
From 1823 to 1832, the Supreme Court decided three cases, 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the so-called "Marshall Trilogy," which would 
serve as the legal foundation for federal Indian policy in the years 
to come.123 
The legal justification for taking over Indian lands came to be 
known as the "doctrine of discovery." In Johnson v. M1ntosh, 
Marshall described this doctrine, long employed by conquering 
European nations, and determined that the United States had 
adopted it. 124 Under this doctrine, the discovering nation inherited 
"the sole right of acquiring soil from the natives." 125 To avoid 
conflicting settlements and war, the European nations in North 
America all agreed to this principle. 126 According to Marshall, the 
rights of Indians were not "entirely disregarded," but "their rights 
to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, 
to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original 
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those. 
who made it."127 When the colonies won independence from the 
British, they took the latter's property rights gained through 
discovery and conquest. 128 Ultimately, these rights passed to the 
United States. 129 Under the doctrine, the United States holds fee 
123. Mathew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 
627-28 (2006) [hereinafter Fletcher, Marshall Trilogy]; see al.so Rebecca A. Hart & M. 
Alexander Lowther, Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts to Protect Native American 
Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CAL. L. REV. 185, 199 (2008) (stating that these cases 
"outline the fundamental principles offederal Indian law"). 
124. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584-87 (1823) 
125. Id. at 573. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 574. 
128. See Hope M. Babcock, Reserved Indian Water Rights in Riparian Jurisdictions: Water, 
Water Everywhere, Perhaps Some Drops for Us, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1203, 1254 (2006) 
(explaining that "fee title to Indian land was first vested in the discovering European 
nation, and later in state sovereigns"). 
129. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587 ("The United States, then, have 
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title to indigenous lands, but Indian tribes have the right to use 
and possess their lands subject to conquest or purchase by, the 
be, 131government. 130 However reviled it may the doctrine of 
discovery remains good law, 132 informing decisions to this very 
day. 133 As it relates to Massachusetts v. EPA, courts have pointed to 
the doctrine of discovery-or at least its underlying principles­
when asserting that tribal sovereignty is of a lesser rank. 134 But 
again, we should question the doctrine insofar as it is founded on a 
presumption of Indian "inferiority."135 
Marshall penned the lead opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgi-a 
seven years later, in 1831. 136 The holding is plain enough-Indian 
tribes do not qualify as "foreign State [s]" within the meaning of 
the Constitution. 137 However, Marshall was not willing to deprive 
tribes of all recognition as political entities. Tribes were "states," he 
concluded, but of a type never before envisioned. He observed 
unequivocally acceded to that great and broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now 
hold this country.... They maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery gave an 
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by 
conquest ...."); see also Babcock, supra note 128, at 1253 ("[T]ribal rights of occupancy 
became the exclusive province of federal law when the Constitution was signed."). 
130. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985). 
131. See Blake A. Watson.john Marshall and Indian Land Rights: A Historical Rejoinder to 
the Claim of "Universal Recognition" of the Doctrine of Discovery, 36 SETON HALL. L. REV. 481 
(2006) (contending that the doctrine of discovery was not nearly so accepted as Chief 
Justice Marshall professed); David Wilkens, Quit-Claiming the Doctrine ofDiscovery: A Treaty­
Based Reappraisal, 23 OKIA. CITY U. L. REV. 277 ( 1998) (criticizing the doctrine of discovery 
on legal and policy grounds); cf. STUART BANNER, How THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: 
I.Aw AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER 12 (2005) (observing that, at least prior to the Seven 
Years War, England "treated the Indians as owners of their land" as a matter of "overall 
English colonial land policy"). 
132. See Andrew Huff, Indigenous Land Rights and the New Self-Detennination, 16 COLO. 
J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 295, 299 (2005). 
133. See, e.g., Del. Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 415-16 (3d Cir. 2006); Seneca 
Nation of Indians v. New York, 382 F.3d 245, 260-72 (2d. Cir. 2004); W. Mohegan Tribe 
and Nation v. Orange County, 395 F.3d 18, 22-23 (2d Cir. 2004). 
134. See, e.g., Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 206 F. Supp. 2d 448, 502-06 
(W.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing the doctrine of discovery and its impact upon the strength of 
tribal title to Indian lands). 
135. See Bradford, supra note 119, at 78 ("While Marshall admitted that this 
argument was 'opposed to natural right' and contrary to principles of justice, he drew 
from the doctrine of stare decisis, comparisons to the practice of other states, and the 
presumption of Indian 'inferiority' to find that 'if [such arguments] be indispensable to 
that system under which the [United States] has been settled, [they] ... certainly cannot 
be rejected by Courts."') (quoting Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591-92 
(1823) (footnotes omitted)). 
136. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
137. /d.at20. 
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that the Cherokee people had to be deemed a state because "[t]he 
numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize 
them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace 
and war, of being responsible in their political character for any 
violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed 
on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their 
community."138 But the reality of the situation meant that tribes 
were not states like Britain and France (and neither like New York 
and Virginia). In Marshall's view, the tribes' relationship to the 
United States "resemble[d] that of a ward to his guardian," and 
therefore they were more properly seen as "domestic dependent 
nations."139 The Court would later rely on this concept to create the 
doctrines of plenary power and the trust relationship. 140 Like the 
doctrine of discovery, however, the concept of tribes as "domestic 
dependent nations" loses credibility along with its theoretical 
underpinning: that native peoples are somehow entitled to less 
respect as sovereigns than whites. Although the Cherokee Nation 
decision recognized tribes as sovereigns to some degree-capable 
of limited self-government and interaction with other nations-we 
should not be too satisfied. There is a strong argument to be 
made that tribal sovereignty should never have been so degraded, 
an argument that supports special solicitude for tribes in that their· 
claims to sovereignty are stronger than the United States has ever 
recognized. 
The last of the trilogy is Worcester v. Georgi,a. 141 A landmark 
decision on federalism, Worcester addressed the extent to which 
states have power to regulate tribes. Georgia had enacted laws that 
purported to extinguish the Cherokee Nation, distribute its land to 
whites, nullify Indian customs and laws, and establish Georgia law 
as the sole governing authority. The Supreme Court struck down 
the laws five to one. Announcing the Court's opinion, ChiefJustice 
·Marshall offered a stern reminder to those who would question 
Indian sovereignty: "The Indian nations had always been 
considered as distinct, independent political commumtles, 
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors 
of the soil, from time immemorial .... The very term 'nation,' so 
generally applied to them, means 'a people distinct from 
138. Id. at 16. 
139. Id. at 17. 
140. Fletcher, Marshall Trilogy, supra note 123, at 653. 
141. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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others.' "142 
The upshot of this, in Marshall's view, was that only the federal 
government had power to regulate tribes: 
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, 
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately 
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, 
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, 
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in 
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The 
whole intercourse between the United States and this 
nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested in the 
government of the United States. 143 
Again, like M1ntosh and Cherokee Nation, Marshall's opinion in 
Worcester was both a win and a loss for tribal sovereignty. On the 
plus side, Worcester recognized that states have no power to regulate 
Indian tribes, essentially placing them at an equal mark on the 
sovereignty scale.144 On the negative side, however, the Marshall 
Court assumed almost a priori that tribal sovereignty could not 
equal that of the United States. For purposes of our argument, 
however, Worcester must be considered a victory. In placing tribes 
and states on a more or less equal footing in terms of sovereignty, 
Worcester supports the claim that tribes should be entitled to the 
same "special solicitude" as states. 
2. 	 Beyond the Marshall Trilogy: Acknowledgi,ng differences between 
tribal and state sovereignty. 
After reading these cases, one might deem it a foregone 
conclusion that tribes are as sovereign as domestic states, if not 
more so. 145 But our critics will be quick to observe that this was 
142. Id. at 559. 
143. Id. at 561. 
144. See Babcock, supra note llO, at 448 ("The Cherokee finally prevailed in 
Worcester, and proponents of tribal sovereignty consider the decision to be among the few 
high water marks in Indian law because it recognized and affirmed the existence of tribal 
sovereignty, albeit a sovereignty cabined by the greater authority of the federal 
government.") (footnote omitted). 
145. See Anne E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall 
Trilogy, and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of 
Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH.]. L. REFORM 651, 668 (2009) ("[T]he Trilogy decisions do, 
in many ways, provide a view of tribal sovereignty that is functionally robust ...."). 
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hardly the Marshall Court's intention,146 and more recent decisions 
preclude any straight-faced claim to that effect. We acknowledge 
that tribal sovereignty is, at least under recent jurisprudence, 
limited in significant ways; it does not track state sovereignty in 
every detail. Despite the differences, however, we believe tribes are 
sufficiently sovereign to deserve special solicitude in the standing 
analysis. In many ways, in fact, special solicitude makes even more 
sense for tribes. But first let us review some of the objec,:tions our 
critics might make. 
Our critics might begin by asking us to consider tribal authority 
over nonmembers, and they would have a point. In Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the Court held that tribes 
lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, even when they 
commit crimes against Indians on Indian land. 147 The Court went a 
146. Consider, for instance, the bigotry underlying the Marshall Trilogy. These cases 
(with the <cxception of Worcester) were premised on the offensive notion that Indians, as 
"savages," were fundamentally inferior to white people. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., 
Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples' 
Rights ofSelf-Determination, 8 ARIZ.]. INT'L & COMP. L. 51, 70 (1991). And, disturbingly, that 
thinking can be seen even in modem decisions. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE 
A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF 
RACISM IN AMERICA (2005). In 1980, Justice Rehnquist dissented from the decision in 
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980). Although his view did not 
win the day, it is shocking nonetheless. To support his position, Rehnquist quoted with 
approval a historian's view that the Plains Indians '"lived only for the day, recognized no 
rights of property, robbed or killed anyone if they thought they could get away with it, 
inflicted cruelty without a qualm, and endured torture without flinching."' Id. at 436-37 
(quoting S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 539-540 (1965)). 
This is not to suggest that modem Indian law is entirely predicated on racism. Much of it 
has to do with political inertia and the realities of contemporary life. Few would seriously 
argue that all land be returned to the ancestors of the original inhabitants, though there 
have been noteworthy cases on that front. See, e.g., Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 
F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005). However, one cannot help but look at Indian law-past and 
current-and detect· real vestiges of racism. Suffice it to say that Indian sovereignty has 
been limited, and many of those limitations flow from a dubious worldview. 
147. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978); see also Nevada v. Hicks, 
533 U.S. 353, 358 (2001). Oliphant is a disturbing read. Then-AssociateJustice Rehnquist, 
writing for the Court, justified the decision by pointing to jurisprudence suggesting 
Indians have limited power because that is all they can handle: 
In In re Mayfield, the Court noted that the policy of Congress had been to allow 
the inhabitants of the Indian country "such power of self-government as was 
thought to be consistent with the safety of the white population with which they 
may have come in contact, and to encourage them as far as possible in raising 
themselves to our standard of civilization. 
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204 (quoting In re Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1891) ). 
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step further in United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), 
deciding that the Crow Tribe could not regulate hunting and 
fishing by nonmembers on land they held in fee simple, despite 
that the land was located within the Crow Reservation. 148 The Court 
came to this conclusion based on a narrow view of tribal power: at 
least where nonmembers are involved, "exercise of tribal power 
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to 
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status 
of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional 
delegation."149 
In response, however, we would ask our critics to recognize that 
Oliphant and Montana are exceptions to the general 
jurisprudence-jurisprudence that respects tribal sovereignty. As 
Justice Blackmun put it, concurring in part and dissenting in part 
in 1989's Brendal,e v. Confederated Tribes, the jurisprudence is 
"remarkable" in that, "except for those few aspects of sovereignty 
recognized in the [Marshall Trilogy] as necessarily divested, the 
Court only once prior to Montana ... has found an additional 
sovereign power to have been relinquished upon incorporation."150 
And to the extent Montana limited tribal civiljurisdiction over non­
members, it was particularly exceptional. In cases following 
Montana, the Court "held without equivocation that tribal civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservation lands is not an aspect 
of tribal sovereignty necessarily divested by reason of the tribes' 
'incorporation within the dominant society."151 Admittedly, there is 
tension in the case law here. But it is best resolved by Justice 
Blackmun's take: In Montana, "the Court simply missed its usual 
way."1s2 
In keeping with the first objection, nevertheless, our detractors 
will press on by noting that state courts enjoy relatively broad 
jurisdietion in comparison with their tribal counterparts. As courts 
of general jurisdiction, state courts have jurisdiction over all 
~ctions save those committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
148. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65. 
149. Id. at 564. 
150. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima, 492 U.S. 408, 453 
(Blackmun, J. concurring in part and dissent in part). When Justice Blackmun 
mentioned the one occasion "prior to Montana," he was referring to Oliphant. Id. 
151. Id. at 454 (Blackmun, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), and Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987)). 
152. Id. at 455 (Blackmun,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
161 2010) EQUAL STANDING WITH STATES 
federal courts. 153 And they have personal jurisdiction over any 
defendant with "minimum contacts" with the forum state. 154 All 
told, jurisdiction in state court is the rule rather than the 
exception; it is often the opposite in tribal court. 155 
The same dynamic is at least facially true, we concede, in the 
context of regulatory power. Whereas state sovereignty is limited 
only where preempted by federal law, a "tribe's sovereign interests 
are now .confined to managing tribal land, 'protect[ing] tribal self­
governance,' and 'control[ling] internal relations."'156 But the 
153. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). 
154. Int'! Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) 
155. The Court made this point forcefully in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), 
where it rejected the argument that a tribal court was a court of "general jurisdiction" 
sufficient to adjudicate a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Distinguishing tribal 
courts from state courts, the majority wrote: 
Respondents' contention that tribal courts are courts of "general jurisdiction" is 
also quite wrong. A state court's jurisdiction is general, in that it 'lays hold of all 
subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of 
dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe.' Tribal 
courts, it should be clear, cannot be courts of general jurisdiction in this sense, 
for a tribe's inherent adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers is at most only 
as broad as its legislative jurisdiction. 
Id. at 367 (citations omitted). 
156. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Lands & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2723 
(2008). In Plains Commerce Bank, a case involving both adjudicatory and regulatory power, 
the Supreme Court gave these categories a narrow construction. A non-Indian bank sold 
land it owned in fee simple on the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation to other non­
Indians. Id. at 2714-15. But an Indian family, the Longs, had been leasing the land with an 
option to buy. Id. at 2715. The Longs claimed that the bank discriminated against them by 
selling the land to the non-members on terms more favorable than they had received, and 
they instituted an action to this effect in tribal court. Id. at 2715-16. The court overruled an 
objection to its jurisdiction, and the jury found in favor of the Longs. Id. at 2716. The Bank 
then sued in district court seeking a declaration that the tribal judgment was void for want 
of jurisdiction. Id. The district court rejected this argument, and the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed, concluding that tribes have authority to regulate the business conduct of non­
members who voluntarily interact with tribal members. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed 
that tribal authority was so broad. The Court stated that, under Montana, there are only 
two exceptions to the rule that tribes lack authority to regulate the conduct of non­
members on land they hold in fee. Id. at 2719-20. The first is the power to regulate the 
conduct of nonmembers "who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements." Id. at 
2720 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). The second 
exception is the ability to "exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee 
lands within the reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the 
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 2720 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). The Supreme Court 
held that the Longs' discrimination suit met neither of these exceptions. Construing the 
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contrast here isn't as great as it seems. Federal preemption of state 
law is so common that if you manipulated the Court's words to 
describe state sovereignty ("a [state] 's sovereign interests are now 
confined to managing [state] land, 'protect[ing] [state] self­
governance,' and 'control [ling] internal relations"') not many 
would blink an eye. 157 
Another vestige of sovereignty that marks a distinction between 
tribes and states (in this case, in favor of tribal sovereignty) is the 
power to enter into treaties with the federal government. Article II 
of the Constitution instills the President with the "Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent bf the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." 158 Although 
this clause does not mention tribes as such, it has long been 
acknowledged that they come within its ambit. 159 Indeed, because 
discrimination suit narrowly, the Court interpreted the case as "challeng[ing] a non­
Indian's sale of non-Indian land." Id. at 2720. The Court distinguished this-the sale of 
land-from conduct on land within a reservation, stating that tribes "may regulate 
nonmember behavior [even on non-Indian fee land] that implicates tribal governance and 
internal relations," but they have no power to regulate the sale of land as such. Id. at 2723. 
It seems to us that this was not so much a fair construction of the nature of the action as it 
was emblematic of the Court's recent antagonism to any real conception of tribal 
sovereignty. To put it mildly, the Plains Commerce Co~rt held once again that "[t]he 
sovereign authority of Indian tribes is limited in ways state and federal authority is not." Id. 
at 2726. 
157. SeeJohn P. Dwyer, The Role ofState Law in an Era ofFederal Preemption: Lessons from 
Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, ·205 (1997) ("[The role of states in 
environmental regulation] is increasingly restricted to those areas not yet subject to 
extensive federal regulation ... and to the implementation and enforcement of permits 
issued pursuant to federal standards and procedures."); Robert A. Schapiro, Federalism as 
Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a Post-Westphalian World, 57 EMORY L. ]. 115, 124 
(2007) (explaining that the Supreme Court has in recent times developed a "robust" 
preemption doctrine). See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption b-y Preamble: Federal 
Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007) (noting the 
increase in federal preemption of state tort law). 
158. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
159. See United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876); 
Johnson v. Mcintosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 593-94 (1823); Thomas H. Pacheco, Indian 
Bedlands Claims: A Need to Clear the Waters, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 n.26 (1991) 
("Under the treaty clause of the United States Constitution, the national government is 
given the exclusive power to enter into treaties with Indian Tribes. Congress ended the 
practice of treaty making by statute in 1871." (citation omitted)); Joseph William Singer, 
Nine-Tenths of the L'liw: Title, Possession and Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605, 614 
(2006) ("The treaty clause made no distinction between treaties made with Indian nations 
and other nations and was the source of federal power to negotiate treaties with Indian 
nations."); see also Phillip M. Kannan, Reinstating Treaty-Making with Native American Tribes, 
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 809, 813 (2008) ("[T]he authority of Indian tribes to enter 
into treaties with ... the United States is a prerequisite to the validity of land title in the 
United States."). ' 
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the United States acquired so much land by striking treaties with 
native tribes, the legitimacy of title rests on a presumption of tribal 
power to make these compacts with the federal government. 
States, on the other hand, cannot enter into treaties with each 
other, the federal government, or foreign nations.160 At a basic 
level, this implies that Indian tribes have more sovereignty than 
states. Cutting in the other direction, though, our critics would 
observe, is more recent history and the emasculation of the treaty 
power by Congress. A treaty has not been struck between the 
United States and an Indian tribe under the Treaty Clause since 
the passage of the Indian Appropriation Act of 1871.161 That Act 
provides that "no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the 
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an 
independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States 
may contract by treaty ...."162 While the Act does not purport to 
invalidate prior treaties,163 it has put a stop to the practice, a policy 
choice that has not been revisited for over 135 years. Since 1871, 
the federal government has dealt with tribes strictly through 
executive agreements and legislation. 164 On the other hand, the 
Indian Appropriation Act notwithstanding,· the President must 
theoretically retain the authority to make treaties with tribes with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. Although the Act appears to 
extinguish this authority, that view cannot be reconciled with the 
fact that an amendment is needed to limit powers enumerated in 
·the Constitution..165 But even if the Act is taken at face value, it at 
worst brings tribes down to the level of states.166 
Which brings us to Congress's "plenary power" to regulate· 
160. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. 1. Tribes also lack the power under the Constitution 
to form treaties with foreign nations. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 573; Kristen A. 
Carpenter, Real Pmperty and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 313, 349 (2008). But this was 
not the case prior to the Constitution, when tribes regularly struck treaties with European 
nations. See Kannan, supra note 159, at 813. 
161. Kannan, supra note 159, at 818. Among other things, the Indian Appropriation 
Act expressed Congress's resolution that Indian tribes were no longer entities "with whom 
the United States may contract by treaty." 25 U.S.C. § 71 (Westlaw 2009). The Act did not 
however, "invalidate[] or impair[]" existing treaties. Id.; see also United States v. Lara, 541 
U.S. 193, 201 (2004). 
. 162. ·25 u.s.c. § 71. 
163. Id. 
164. Kannan, supra note 159, at 818. 
165. But see Organized Viii. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962). See generally 
Browsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) .. 
166. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (denying states the power to enter into 
treaties). 
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Indians, perhaps the most serious hurdle to advancing a robust 
conception of tribal sovereignty.167 This power is said to flow 
primarily from the Indian Commerce Clause, under which 
Congress has power "[t]o regulate Commerce with .... the Indian 
Tribes."168 Although it seems questionable to derive plenary power 
from this language, 169 it is not all that remarkable-look at the 
broad grant of power under the interstate portion of the 
Commerce Clause. 170 Of course, no one would assert that Congress 
has plenary power to regulate states by virtue of the Commerce 
Clause, rendering the textualist objection that much stronger in 
the case of Indian tribes. 171 Whatever strength this argument may 
have, however, it is black-letter law that Congress has the power to 
abrogate any treaty it desires, limit a tribe's power to govern itself, 
and renege on a previous recognition of a tribe as a legal entity. 172 
Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of deriving plenary power from 
the Indian Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has identified 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the 
Treaty Clause, the War Power, and the Property Clause as 
167. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). 
168. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has also identified the Treaty 
Clause, the War Powers Clause, and the Property Clause as contributing to Congress's 
plenary power to regulate Indian affairs. United States v. Lara, 541U.S.193, 200 (2004). 
169. See Mathew M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 509, 522 
(2007) [Hereinafter Fletcher, Federal Power] ("The text of the Indian Commerce Clause 
suggests (perhaps) that congressional authority in the field of Indian affairs is less than 
plenary, if one accepts the argument that 'commerce' does not include the entire field ... 
."); id. at 565 (observing that scholarship suggests "this is a weak source of authority"). 
170. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (confirming congressional "power 
to regulate purely local activities" that substantially impact interstate commerce). 
171. In Lara.Justice Thomas took issue with the majority's unquestioning acceptance 
of the plenary-power doctrine, writing: 
I do, however, agree that this case raises important constitutional questions that 
the Court does not begin to answer. The Court utterly fails to find any provision 
of the Constitution that gives Congress enumerated power to alter tribal 
sovereignty. The Court cites the Indian Commerce Clause and the treaty power. 
I cannot agree that the Indian Commerce Clause "provide[s] Congress with 
plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs." At one time, the 
implausibility of this assertion at least troubled the Court, and I would be willing 
to revisit the question. · 
·Lara, 54 U.S. at 224 (Thomas,]., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Cotton Petroleum, 
490 U.S. at 192.) 
172. GETCHES, WILKINSON, & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 5. 
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supplementary sources of authority.173 We admit that congressional 
authority to regulate states is far more limited. Congress's power 
under the Commerce Clause is extremely broad,174 even after 
United States v. Lopez,175 as is ~ts spending power. 176 Yet the Tenth 
Amendment, 177 state sovereign immunity, 178 and political pressure 
from the reinvigorated states-rights movement179 all combine to 
stem the tide of congressional overreaching into state affairs. 
III. CONNECTING THE DOTS 
A. Tribes Are Nevertheless Sovereign 
The shortcomings of tribal sovereignty notwithstanding, tribes 
are sovereign in meaningful ways_. Legally and sociologically, tribes 
173. Fletcher, Federal Power, supra note 169, at 562; Robert]. Miller, The Doctrine of 
Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 105-06 (2005). 
174. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); New York v: United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); see al,so DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & 
STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CA.sES, AND 
PHILOSOPHY 208 (1998) (explaining that these cases effectively authorize Congress to 
commandeer states as agents of the federal government). 
175. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995); see al,so H.Jeffrey Moulton, The 
Quixotic Search for a judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 890 (1999) ("In 
the end, ... the Court's reaffirmance of cases like Wickard v. Filburn and Katzenbach v. 
McClung suggests that as a practical matter congressional power is not much diminished. 
Perhaps the best description of Lopez's significance is as one in a series of periodic 
reminders to Congress that its powers are not plenary ...."). 
176. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17; Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of the 
Commerce Clause After Morrison, 25 OKIA. CnY U. L. REV. 843, 857 (2000) ("Given the 
broad sweep of the spending power as currently construed, the federal government would 
quite clearly have the ability to evade the direct limits on its Commerce Clause powers."); 
Nelson Lund, Fig LeafFederalism and Tenth Amendment Exceptionalism, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 
11, 15 (2005) ("The reach of Lopez and Morrison may tum out to be extremely narrow. 
That at least appears to be the implication of the 6-3 decision in Gonzales v. Raich . ..."); id. 
at 17 ("[F]ederal authority under the Commerce Clause and the so-called Spending 
Clause is so broad and flexible that Congress should be able rather easily to induce the 
states to take virtually any action that New York and Printz forbid the federal legislature to 
command directly."). 
177. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
178. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) 
(holding that "state sovereign immunity bars [an administrative agency] from adjudicating 
complaints filed by a private party against a nonconsenting State"); Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) ("We hold that notwithstanding Congress' clear intent to 
abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant 
Congress that power, and therefore [the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] cannot grant 
jurisdiction over a State that does not consent to be sued."). 
179. See Roger F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CA.sE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 645 
(1996) ("States' rights seem at least momentarily ascendant.") · 
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possess enough attributes of sovereign entities that they ought to 
enjoy special solicitude the same as Massachusetts or any other 
state. And the sovereignty that tribes have is similar to states in 
ways relevant to the standing analysis. 
To begin with, tribes are similar to states in terms of sovereign 
immunity in federal court. 180 This immunity from suit is a crucial 
aspect of sovereignty, 181 and both tribes and states enjoy similar 
protections under this doctrine. 182 Neither tribes nor states are 
required to defend a suit absent their consent, and any such 
consent must be "unequivocally expressed."183 And because tribal 
and state sovereign immunity is a defense to liability as well as 
protection from suit, both tribes and states may appeal an adverse 
determination of sovereign immunity on an interlocutory basis. 184 
Sovereign immunity has long benefitted the sovereign defendants 
by providing that they need not answer to a federal court when 
they do not want to. "Special solicitude" in the standing analysis 
provides the parallel benefit to the sovereign plaintiff, granting it 
the ability to invoke the aid of the federal judiciary when it so 
desires. 
Of course, it is true that Congress is limited in its ability to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity, 185 while tribal sovereign 
180. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) ("Indian tribes have long 
been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed 
by sovereign powers."). 
181. Alden, 527 U.S. at 716 ('"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent."') (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 
(Alexander Hamilton)). 
182. E.g., Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 746 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("As sovereigns, 
Indian tribes enjoy immunity against suits. This immunity flows from a tribe's sovereign 
status in much the same way as it does for the States and for the federal government." 
(citations and footnotes omitted)). 
183. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United 
Statesv. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)). 
184. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) 
(states); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(tribes); Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1179-80 (10th Cir. 
1999) (same); Tamiami Partners v. Mlccosukee Tribe oflndians, 63 F.3d 1030, 1050 (11th 
Cir. 1995) (same). 
185. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996). Some have also suggested 
that the legal sources for tribal and state sovereign immunity differ. See, e.g., Theresa R. 
Wilson, Nations Within a Nation: The Evolution of Tribal Immunity, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 99, 
101 (2000) ("Unlike state immunity, which is written directly into the Constitution by the 
Eleventh Amendment, tribal immunity is a product of case law."). This understanding is 
far too simplistic. The text of the Eleventh Amendment goes only a small way toward 
establishing robust sovereign immunity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) 
("[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms 
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immunity can be abrogated under Congress's plenary authority.186 
Nevertheless, the point remains that until Congress acts, both 
tribes and states retain this important component of their 
sovereignty - a right that was not given to them by anyone but 
retained by virtue of their status as sovereigns. · 
What's more, both tribes and states may proceed parens patriae 
in litigation. 187. Parens patriae suits have the advantage of allowing 
the sovereign to sue on behalf of a widely shared injury suffered by 
its population where no one individual has standing to bring the 
suit. 188 But because "[t]he parens patriae action has its roots in the 
common-law concept of the 'royal prerogative"' of the sovereign to 
care for its citizenry, this type of lawsuit is necessarily reserved to 
sovereign entities alone. 189 Consequently, not just anyone can file a 
parens patriae suit: the privilege of doing so has been denied to 
cities190 and foreign nations, 191 because neither cities nor foreign 
nations are sovereigns within the federal system. This poses no 
obstacle for tribes to assert quasi-sovereign interests in the federal 
courts. 
The existence of the parens patriae suit is hardly an irrelevant 
consideration. Although not directly employed by Massachusetts, 
the Massachusetts Court relied heavily on the parens patriae doctrine 
in its articulation of standing rules. The parens patriae and special 
solicitude doctrines are motivated, at least in part, by the same 
consideration: the quasi-sovereign interest of the sovereign in the 
well-being of its population. The state's right to proceed parens 
patriae gave the Court reason to give states the benefit of "special 
solicitude." This same reasoning applies with equal force to tribes. 
of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather,... the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental 
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the 
Constitution, and which they retain today ..."). Both tribes and states enjoy sovereign 
immunity based on their status as pre-Constitutional sovereigns. 
186. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56-58. 
187. E.g., Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 1137 (8th Cir. 
1974). See generally Allan Kanner, Ryan Casey, & Barrett Ristroph, New Opportunities for 
Native American Tribes to Pursue Environmental and Natural Resource Claims, 14 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL'Y F. 155 (2003); Note, Native Americans: The Tribe as Parens Patriae, 5 MICH.]. 
RA.CE & L. 665 (2000). 
188. Comment, State Standing to Challenge Federal Administrative Action: A Re­
Examination of the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1074-78 (1977). 
189. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 
(1982). 
190. City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). 
191. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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Our argument for equality of tribes and states in the standing 
analysis is even stronger when it comes to environmental litigation 
because the federal government frequently treats states and tribes 
alike when it comes to the development of environmental policy. 192 
EPA, the "first federal agency to formally adopt an Indian policy," 
has long recognized the responsibility of tribes in the field of 
environmental regulation. 193 The policy . emphasized tribal self­
government, and noted that "Tribal Governments [are] sovereign 
entities with primary authority and responsibility for the 
reservation populace."194 As a result, the policy called for the 
agency to assume a "government-to-government" relationship with 
tribes, and to delegate environmental regulation to Indian tribes 
"under terms similar to those governing delegations to States." 195 
Congress codified and expanded this practice by writing it into 
major environmental statutes, such as the Clean Water Act and the 
Clean Air Act. 196 These complex environmental statutes provide a 
considerable role for both classes of subordinate sovereigns to 
regulate. Implicitly, these laws recognize the importance of states 
and tribes in creating effective environmental policy, and the 
interest that each possesses in a healthy environment. 
Through the 1987 Amendments to the Clean Water Act, 
Congress directed that "Indian tribes shall be treated as States" 197 
under certain circumstances for purposes of administering that 
law. This gives tribes the same authority as states to assume the 
permitting process for discharges into navigable waters from 
"point sources" such as pipes and ditches. 198 Yet this power is not 
absolute, and both tribes and states find themselves relying on the 
federal government in important ways.. 
The Clean Air Act-the basis for the petitioners' complaint in 
192. See generally David F. Coursen, EPA's New Tribal Strategy, 38 ENVrL. L. REP. NEWS 
&ANALYSIS 10643, 10643 (2008). 
193. Id. 
194. EPA, POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON 
INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1984), http://www.epa.gov/tribalportal/pdf/indian-policy-84.pdf. 
195. Id. at 2. 
196. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (Westlaw 2009); 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (d) (Westlaw 2009). 
Significantly, under these statutes, Congress has delegated to tribes authority to regulate 
that had been eroded by recent Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. 
EPA, 211 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See generally Thomas P. Schlosser, Federal Delegation 
of Tribal Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers (Sept. 1999), 
http://www.msaj.com/papers/feddeleg.htm.. 
197. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (Westlaw 2009). 
198. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (Wesi:Iaw 2009). 
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Massachusetts--also treats tribes as states. The Clean Air Act 
authorizes states to assume responsibility for developing plans 
(known as State Implementation Plans, or SIPs) to achieve 
established ambient air quality standards. 199 In 1990, Congress 
amended the Clean Air Act to authorize EPA to "treat Indian tribes 
as States" if they satisfy certain criteria.200 This extended to "Indian 
tribes the same opportunity as states_ to implement" plans under 
the SIP program. 201 The difficulty in implementing a successful SIP 
program has been emphasized by one commentator as the real 
motivation for Massachusetts's lawsuit.202 Tribes, like states, have 
been largely precluded from directly regulating automobile 
emissions, and therefore, like states, have an interest in seeing EPA 
pick up the slack. 
Even in areas with clean air, both tribes and states may seek to 
re-designate their territory into a more protective category to 
improve air quality-a right that has been exercised by Indian 
tribes on six occasions, and by states on none.203 Outside their legal 
duties, tribes are assuming a role equal to (and in some cases 
greater than) that of states in reaching voluntary compacts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.204 This similar treatment makes 
the argument for tribal "special solicitude" the strongest in cases 
where the tribe seeks to redress an environmental harm. 
The final point to make about tribal versus state sovereignty­
the source of that sovereignty-may be the most fundamental. 
State claims to sovereignty are rooted in the Constitution; tribal 
claims are pre-constitutional, even extra-constitutional. There is a 
definite contrast here, but it is not clear what the upshot is. The 
"Supreme Law of the Land" recognizes state sovereignty,205 but "it 
199. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4707(a), 4710 (Westlaw 2009). 
200. 42 U.S.C. § 760l(d) (Westlaw 2009). See generally Mark E. Chandler, A Link 
Between Water Quality and Water Rights?: Native American Control over Water Quality, 30 TULSA 
LJ. 105 (1994). 
201. Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
202. \\forriss, supra note 43, at 209-11. 
203. Sarah B. Van de Wetering & Matthew McKinney, The Role of Mandatory Dispute 
Resolution in Federal Environmental Law: Lessons From the Clean Air Act, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 1, 3-4 (2006). 
204. The Climate Registry, a coalition of United States and Mexican states, Canadian 
provinces, and Indian tribes, is an example of one such agreement. See Climate Registry 
Brochure, http:/ /www.theclimateregistry.org/downloads/Registry_Brochure.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2009). 
205. See U.S. CONST. amend. x· ("The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
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is at least arguable that the origin of tribal sovereignty is more 
consistent with some philosophical notions of a 'sovereign' than 
the already-compromised sovereignty of states that emerges from 
the Constitution."206 That is, states have to admit that they 
voluntarily gave up some aspect of their sovereignty when they 
ratified the Constitution; tribes need make no such admission.207 
Tribes may need to concede that they were stripped of some of 
their sovereignty against their will, but this is different from ceding 
sovereignty voluntarily (or contractually) as did states. This is one 
more way, perhaps, in which tribal claims to sovereignty are 
stronger than those of the states. Neither are full-fledged 
sovereigns as it now stands, but the road they took to arrive at that 
point should not be ignored. 
B. Equal Standing With States 
So where are we going with all this? It's quite simple, really. 
Massachusetts v. EPA says sovereigns get "special solicitude" in the 
standing analysis; tribes (like states) are sovereign; therefore courts 
should treat tribes like states when making the standing inquiry. 
And, we would add, tribes' need for special solicitude is greater 
than that of states. 
Special solicitude for tribes follows logically from Massachusetts 
v. EPA. To the extent that tribal sovereignty has been recognized 
by the courts, it is subject to divestment by Congress at will. As 
argued above, the special solicitude rule is driven in no small part 
by preemption: the loss of rulemaking authority due to the actions 
of a higher sovereign. Both states and tribes can suffer 
preemption, but Congress has plenary authority to act in tribal 
matters, thereby exposing tribes to the· risk of virtually unlimited 
preemption. With this limitation in regulatory power comes a 
commensurate need to invoke the judiciary's aid in compelling 
federal action for the benefit of the tribe's citizenry. 
The constitutional source for the bulk of Congress's power to 
or to the people."); Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1976), overruled Uy 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) ("While the Tenth 
Amendment has been characterized as a truism ... it is not without significance. The 
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise 
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in 
a federal system." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
206. Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic 
Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1156 (2004). 
207. Id, 
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regulate in non;-Indian affairs is the Commerce Clause, coupled 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause.208 Between the 1940s and 
1990s, the Supreme Court upheld every law passed by Congress 
pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority. However, it never 
conceded that Congress in fact possessed plenary authority to 
regulate. Instead, the Court formally scrutinized every statute. 
As mentioned above, there is no such limit when it comes to 
regulation of tribes and preemption of tribal laws. The Supreme 
Court has recognized that Congress possesses general police power 
to regulate affairs in Indian country.209 This authority has remained 
absolute during eras of both broad and narrow conceptions of the 
Commerce Clause vis-a-vis states. For over one hundred years, the 
Supreme Court has recognized congressional authority to pass 
general criminal laws governing Indian country.210 In contrast, even 
at the height of congressional power over states, the Supreme 
Court stressed that Congress may not pass general criminal laws 
without establishing a connection to interstate commerce.211 And 
208. Reeve T. Bull, Note, The Virtue of Vagueriess: A Defense ofSouth Dakota v. Dole, 56 
DUKE LJ. 279, 281 (2006). 
209. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) ("[T]he Constitution grants 
Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have 
consistently described as 'plenary and exclusive."'); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (finding that the Indian Commerce Clause vests 
"Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field oflndian affairs"). This rule has been 
heavily criticized, as it is strange that the same Constitutional provision, the Commerce 
Clause, with the same language could carry such dramatically different interpretations 
depending on the subject of the regulation. See Fletcher, Federal Power, supra note 169, at 
522 ("The text of the Indian Commerce Clause suggests (perhaps) that congressional 
authority in the field of Indian affairs is less than plenary, if one accepts the argument that 
· "commerce" does not include the entire field ....");id. at 565 (observing that scholarship 
suggests "this is a weak source of authority"). Justice Thomas has raised questions about 
the Court's unquestioning acceptance of the plenary-power doctrine: 
I do, however, agree that this case raises important constitutional questions that 
the Court does not begin to answer. The Court utterly fails to find any provision 
of the Constitution that gives Congress enumerated power to alter tribal 
sovereignty. The Court cites the Indian Commerce Clause and the treaty power. 
I cannot agree that the Indian Commerce Clause "provide[s] Congress with 
plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs." At one time, the 
implausibility of this assertion at least troubled the Court, and I would be willing 
to revisit the question. 
Lara, 541 U.S. at 224 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Cotton 
Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192). 
210. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886). 
211. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151-52 (1971). 
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while more recent decisions have invigorated at least some judicial 
limits on Congress's Commerce Clause authority as it relates to 
states,212 the Court has declined to extend this reasoning to the 
regulation of Indian country.213 Because power to regulate involves 
_power to preempt, this means there are many areas in which tribes 
can lose their rulemaking ability, even more than states.214 
The broad powers over Indian tribes are intertwined with 
another aspect of the relationship between the federal government 
and tribes: the trust relationship. While the federal government 
owes nothing to states other than compliance with the law, it "owes 
fiduciary duties to American Indians."215 Originally founded in 
racism216 and a patronizing view of the tribe as a ward dependent 
on its guardian,217 the actions of the federal government to tribes 
to this day are understood in light of the existence of a trust 
relationship.218 This relationship has given tribes broader authority 
than others to sue for violations of a statute or regulation by the 
United States. While the Supreme Court has insisted that the 
statute or regulation must establish a fiduciary obligation, it has 
construed such laws broadly in light of "the undisputed existence 
of a general trust relationship between the United States and the 
Indian people,"219 and authorized monetary damages for breach 
where the substantive law in question did not.220 When an agency 
fails to regulate when it should, tribes suffer a breach of this trust 
relationship. Tribal regulation and preemption often come from 
the bureaucracy rather than the legislature. "A great deal of 
Congress's authority in Indian Country is delegated to the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs."221 Judicial review of agency action is even more 
212. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (emphasizing that the 
general criminal law lies beyond Congress's authority). See also United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
213. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200. 
214. For example, Congress has limited the authority of tribes to enforce criminal 
legislation over tribal members when the term of imprisonment exceeds one year. 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(7) (Westlaw 2009). 
215. Reid Peyton Chambers, judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to 
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1213 & n.l (1975) (collecting cases). 
216. See Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 422, 
426-27 (1984). 
217. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.} 1, 17 (1831). 
218. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 505-06 (2003). 
219. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983). 
220. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 506. 
221. Jacob T. Levy, Three Perversities of Indian Law, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 329, 334 
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needed for tribes, given the vast amount of power wielded by these 
agencies over tribal affairs. One would also expect tribes to be 
better advocates in federal court than their state counterparts. 
Critical to the Supreme Court's "special solicitude" rule is its belief 
that state litigation fulfills the goals of standing by providing 
zealous advocacy.222 Yet whether a state will represent its position 
more fervently than an ordinary litigant or ideologically motivated 
nonprofit organization is also far from clear. Determining its 
litigation position-like crafting policy-often requires the state 
decision maker to take the stance favorable to one faction of the 
citizenry over another. The position ultimately adopted may be 
largely due to the beliefs of the person elected as attorney 
general. 223 Elections cause changes in personnel and state policy, 
and coalitions and constituent concerns shift rapidly. 224 And some 
state actors might act solely for political reasons, rather than an 
actual interest in promoting the health or safety of their 
citizenry.225 
In contrast, tribes are smaller, more cohesive units with 
internal cultural homogeneity that exceeds anything approached 
by states.226 The likelihood that a minority will capture the 
·sovereign as a vehicle for vocalizing its concerns is greater in the 
instance of a state than a tribe. And after a tribe commits its 
limited resources to a lawsuit, it is unlikely it will simply abandon it. 
There are other, perhaps more fundamental reasons why tribes 
(2008). 
222. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007). The Court was not alone in 
this conclusion: a leading treatise (recognized by the majority opinion as an authority) 
concluded that "[s] tate-instituted litigation is likely to satisfy all the functional needs of the 
adversary process." 13B CHARLES AlAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 3531.11.1 (3d ed. 2008). 
223. Several commentators have noted the increased role that attorneys general may 
have under the "special solicitude" afforded to states. Mank, Standing, supra note 63, at 
1780-85; Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 1, 37-50 (2007). 
224. The fact that the state of Idaho intervened at the Court of Appeals but chose 
not to join or file a brief in the Supreme Court, effectively abandoning the case prior to its 
resolution, casts doubt on the Court's confidence in states. 
225. One commentator, for example, suggests that Texas's location along the coast 
and high rate of pollution will create "unwelcome and catastrophic consequences of 
climate change" within the state. Powers, supra note 88, at 148-49. However, Texas 
supported EPA's decision to not regulate greenhouse gases. 
226. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST 
AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTI' 18 (1984); Wenona T. Singe!, Cultural 
Sovereignty and Transplanted Law: Tensions in Indigenous Self-Rule, 15 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'¥ 
357, 367 (2006). 
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in particular make good environmental plaintiffs: the importance 
of sovereignty to tribes (they covet it) and a disposition towards 
environmental stewardship (reflecting a deeper relationship with 
the land). 
For all the limitations of Indian sovereignty discussed above, 
the special status of tribes in the eyes of the law· cannot be 
overlooked. Nor can we overstate tribes' affinity for their 
sovereignty.227 According to William H. Rodgers, tribal sovereignty 
is a "precious asset," particularly in the environmental context.228 
The movement for greater sovereignty has coincided with the 
movement for ·better stewardship of the earth, and the two 
complement each other. The confluence of these movements has 
yielded new innovations in conservation, such · as tribal 
conservation trust projects. 229 Apart from federal environmental 
law, where assertion of tribal sovereignty plays a key role, tribal 
"natural" law is inextricably intertwined with sovereignty. Many 
tribes believe, as a matter of religion, that they are appointed as 
stewards of the world around them.230 Sovereignty is crucial: "In 
effect, tribes use their sovereignty to exercise their spiritual duty to 
227. Krakoff, supra note 206, at 1111. If the Supreme Court were ever to abrogate 
tribal sovereignty, Professor Krakoff opines that the decision would be 
met with shock and outrage by many members of tribal nations for whom 
"sovereignty" is as common and heartfelt a term as "rights" is to most other 
Americans. Many tribal ·members perceive that their cultural survival is 
inextricably linked to their existence as separate, self-governing nations, and that 
dealing a final blow to the legal doctrine of sovereignty would be akin to 
terminating tribal people themselves. 
Id. 
228. William H. 'Rodgers, Jr., Tribal Government &les in Environmental Federalism, 21­
WTR NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 3 (2007). Rodgers makes the point with a pair of 
rhetorical questions: "Is sovereignty a valuable asset to have in contemporary 
environmental struggles? Just ask the Natural Resources Defense Council or the Sierra 
Club or the National Wildlife Federation. Would they turn down 'sovereignty' were there a 
chance to seize it?" Id. 
229. Mary Christina Wood & Matthew O'Bri~n, Tribes as Trustees Again (Part II): 
Evaluating Four Models of Tribal Participation in the Conservation Trust Movement, 27 STAN. 
ENVTL. L. J. 477, 505 (2008). On the other hand, some scholars have noted that the 
environmental movement can pose a threat to tribal sovereignty if its advocates are too 
narrowly focused on the environment, thereby ignoring tribes' sovereign interests. See, e.g., 
Eileen Gauna, El Dia de los Muertos: The Death and &birth of the Environmental Movement, 38 
ENVTL. L. 457, 465-66 (2008). 
230. Mary Christine Wood & Zachary Welker, Tribes as Trustees Again (Part I): The 
Emerging Tribal &le in the Conservation Trust Movement, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 373, 385 
(2008). 
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protect the interests of beneficiaries in distant generations."231 
And Indian tribes have a lot to lose. Tribal land holdings are 
vast and unique. Ironically, for the original federal policies sought 
the exact opposite result,232 tribes today lay claim to a treasure trove 
of natural resources and places of extreme beauty. Indians account 
for less than one percent of the nation's population, yet they own 
40% of this country's coal reserves, 65% of its uranium reserves, 
large amounts of gold, silver, cadmium, oil, copper, zinc, and 
billions of cubic feet of natural gas.233 They have vast timber 
resources, all while "guard[ing] the door to 20 percent of the 
nation's freshwater and millions of acres of pristine real estate."234 
These holdings are threatened in myriad ways, and the outlook is 
often grim. However, with the tool of sovereignty, tribes have the 
strength to fight back. 
Additionally, Indians may have more reason than most to be 
offended by environmental crises, for they tend to possess a special 
relationship with their lands. This is partly due to legal restrictions 
and partly the product of cultural phenomena. 
Legally, tribal members face obstacles that make it much more 
difficult for them to pick up and move. Land in "Indian 
Country"-a broad, legally significant term-includes land on 
reservations, "dependent" Indian communities (such as .the New 
Mexico pueblos), land that the federal government holds in trust 
for individual tribal members, and land that tribal members hold 
in fee but with restrictions on alienation.235 So while "[t]ribes and 
individual Indians own the beneficial interest in 55 million acres of 
land,"236 strings are firmly attached to each and every acre. An 
Indian who lives on a parcel of trust land, for instance, has no 
power to sell: the United States holds title to the land; the tribal 
government manages it for the benefit of the tribal community; 
231. Id. 
232. See Lee Herold Storey, Comment, Leasing Indian Water off the Reservation: A Use 
Consistent with the Reservation's Purpose, 76 CAL. L. REV. 179, 20Ml (1988) (discussing the 
purpose and effect of the Indian Removal Act of 1830). 
233. PAUL VANDEVELDER, COYOTE WARRIOR: ONE MAN, THREE TRIBES, AND THE 
TRIAL THAT FORGED A NATION 3 (2004). 
234. Id. 
235. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (Westlaw 2009); see a/,so Kristina L. McCulley, The American 
Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004: The Death of Fractionation or Individual Native American 
Property Interests and Tribal Customs?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 401, 406-07 (2006). 
236. Kevin Gover, Moving Beyond the Current Paradigm: Rede.fining the Federal-Tribal 
Trust Relationship for This Century, 46 NAT.. RESOURCESJ. 317, 346 (2006). 
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and the tribe can sell the land only if the federal government 
approves. 237 The result is frustratingly simple: the law makes it 
burdensome for tribal members to leave. 
That said, staying. on traditional lands finds support in Indian 
culture. Historical revisionism has done its part to paint Indians as 
selfless keepers of the earth.238 That picture is not wholly 
accurate-Indian tribes overused fire as a land-control mechanism, 
overharvested beaver, buffalo, and perhaps even mastodon239-but 
it is well established that many Indians have traditionally viewed 
the earth in a way very different from their white American 
counterparts. They have approached the land with something akin 
to a Gaia philosophy: 
a perception of the earth as an animate being; a belief that 
humans are in a kinship system with other living things; a 
perception of the land as essential to the identity of the people; 
and a concept of reciprocity and balance that extends to 
relationships among humans, includin~ future generations, and 
between humans and the natural world. 40 
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 
U.S. 439 (1988), the Supreme Court took note of the spiritual 
relationship between a tribe and its land. Although the Court 
rejected the tribe's challenge to a logging project on free-exercise­
of-religion grounds, it credited the tribe's contention that its 
religion and worldview were anchored deeply in geography: 
237. See id. at 347; Denise Chee, Unique Aspects ofHousing Development on Tribal Lands, 
10-SPG EXPERIENCE 7, 8-9 (2000); Ezra Rosser, This Land Is My Land, This Land Is Your 
Land: Markets and Institutions for Economic Development on Native American Land, 47 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 245, 259 (2005); see also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense Out ofNevada v. Hicks: A 
.Reinterpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 347, 368 (2001). 
238. See generally SHEPARD KRECH III, THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN: MYTH AND HISTORY 
(1999). 
239. See PAGE, supra note 5, at 36-40 (discussing the "Pleistocene Overkill," a 
controversial theory positing that Native Americans drove mastodons to extinction 
between 11,500 and 10,800 B.C.). 
240. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era ofSeif-Determination: The Role 
ofEthics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 276 ( 1996). 
Tsosie's thoughts are insightful, but the environmental compassion of Indians is even 
more evident in the words of Indians themselves. The number of pleas by native leaders 
over the years for a more sensitive approach in things ecological is remarkable. Chief 
Seattle's is perhaps the most stirring, underscoring the idea that many Indians traditionally 
thought of the earth as a living creature. See Chief Seattle's 1854 Oration, 
http://www.halcyon.com/arborhts/chiefsea.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2010). 
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Those [religious] practices are intimately and inextricably bound 
up with the unique features of the Chimney Rock area, which is 
known to the Indians as the "high country." Individual 
practitioners use this area for personal spiritual development; 
some of their activities are believed to be critically important in 
advancing the welfare of the Tribe, and indeed, of mankind 
itself. The Indians use this area, as they have used it for a very 
long time, to conduct a wide variety of specific rituals that aim to 
accomplish their religious goals. According to their beliefs, the 
rituals would not be efficacious if conducted at other sites than 
the ones traditionally used, and too much disturbance on the 
area's natural state would clearly render any meaningful 
continuation of traditional practices impossible.241 
The bulk of evidence suggests that the tribe in Lyng was 
anything but an aberration. Part of this is due to the fact that 
Indians have viewed themselves as tied to certain spaces in 
perpetuity, a view that has been reinforced by the legal restrictions 
discussed above. The sacred tribal sites littered across the 
American West stand as testaments to this way oflife.242 
David Getches has dubbed this worldview a "philosophy of 
permanence."243 This is a mentality that "commits the people to a 
permanent existence in harmony with everything around them" 
and "explains the success of these people in surviving in America 
for thousands of years," from prehistoric challenges to the slings 
and arrows of life on the reservation. How much this "philosophy 
of permanence" has eroded with the passage of time is subject to 
debate, but old habits die hard.244 A vivid example of contemporary 
241. Lyngv. Nw. Indian CemeteryProtectiveAssoc'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988). 
242. See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Old Ground and New Directions at Sacred Sites on 
the Western Landscape; 83 DEN. L. REV. 981 (2006) (discussing the clash between Indian and 
non-Indian interests at sacred sites). · 
243. David H. Getches, A PhilosO'fJhy ofPermanence: The Indians' Legacy Jar the West, 24 J. 
w. 54, 54-68 (1990) .. 
244. Getches has argued convincingly that a philosophy of permanence is alive and 
well in tribal communities. He explains: 
The Indians' philosophy of permanence based on an ethical relationship with 
the land was fully developed at the time of white contact. They survived to that 
point compatibly with the resources around them by living as if they were there 
to stay. They have since resisted attempts to change them and to part them from 
their land and culture against apparently insuperable odds by holding fast to the 
same philosophical anchor. And they are now sophisticated managers in their 
own right serving as models for their governments. 
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Indians tied to the land comes from the Navajo people of Coyote 
Canyon, New Mexico. When a child is horn in this community, the 
parents bury the umbilical cord in their land because they expect 
the child to live and die there.245 If that is not symbolic of a 
philosophy of permanence (and a special relationship with the 
land), nothing is. 
In sum, sovereignty is precious to tribes (they rightfully see it as 
critical to their very identities) and tribes are uniquely positioned 
to take care of their natural resources (they tend to hold their land 
more dearly than most) .246 Massachusetts v. EPA provides a way for 
Id. at 67. 
245. Hearing on the Health and Environmental Impacts of Uranium Contamination in the 
Navajo Natio~, 11"' Cong. (2007) (statement of George Arthur, Chairman, Resources 
Committee, Navajo Nation Council), http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=l560. After 
describing this tradition, Arthur explained that the Navajo are reluctant to move even in 
the face of extreme contamination from uranium mining: "The Navajos' ties to the land 
where they are born is profound. We don'tjust move when conditions become difficult... 
. [R)elocating a Navajo from her ancestral land is tantamount to separating the Navajo· 
from her spirit." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
246. It is also worth noting that international developments are reinvigorating 
domestic tribal sovereignty. In September 2007, the United Nations issued its Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, bolstering native claims for self-governance. The 
Declaration provides in part: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development. 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the 
right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and 
local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous affairs. 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct 
political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their 
right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social, and 
cultural life of the State. 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters 
which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in 
accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their 
own indigenous decision-making institutions. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, Art. III-V, XVIII, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/L.67 (Sept. 13, 2007), 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (denominations of 
Articles omitted). Although the Declaration is non-binding (and the United States refused 
to sign), it has generated momentum internationally and at home. In Bolivia, a country 
with a majority-indigenous population, President Evo Morales has called for massive 
reform that would bolster native adjudicatory power. See generally ChristopherJ. Fromherz, 
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tribes to employ their sovereignty in environmental litigation, and 
the need for special solicitude is greater for tribes than it is for 
states because tribes are subject to more regulation and their laws 
are more readily preempted. 
CONCLUSION 
There are two classes of sovereigns that exist within the 
territorial boundaries of the United' States but that are distinct 
from the United States. In 2007, the Supreme Court expanded the 
ability of states ~o litigate in federal courts through the articulation 
of the "special solicitude" doctrine. The rationales motivating this 
standing rule fully support its application to the other set of 
sovereigns within the United States-Indian tribes. In fact, the 
rationales suggest that tribes require the aid of the federal 
judiciary more than their state counterparts, and will be better 
advocates for causes that benefit thel.r constituencies. It follows 
that tribes are entitled to take advantage of the "special solicitude" 
standing rule announced by the Massachusetts Court. 
Professor Felix Cohen famously posited that society's treatment 
of Indians was analogous to a canary in a coal mine: 
Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from 
fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our 
treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of 
other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our 
democratic faith. 247 
Indian tribes also may provide early warning of environmental 
harm. Many tribes· have unique ties to land and a more direct 
Indigenous Peoples' Courts: Egalitarian juridical Pluralism, Self-Determination, and the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peopks, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1341 (2008). In the 
U.S., a group of Lakota Indians, led by famed Indian activist Russell Means, issued a letter 
to the Department of State following the Declaration announcing their withdrawal from 
all treaties with the federal government. Bill Harlan, Lakota Group Secedes from U.S., RAPID 
CI1YJ., Dec. 19, 2007. According to Means, founder of the American Indian Movement, 
the Lakota are now a sovereign people, "a free country and independent of the United 
States ofAmerica." Id. However, Means does not represent any federally-recognized tribe, 
and his proposal has received mixed response from elected tribal officials. Bill Harlan, Two 
Tribal Leaders Reject Secession, RAPID CI1YJ.,Jan. 7, 2008. For now, then, Means's efforts are 
more symbolic than anything else. 
247. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights: 1950-1953, A Case Study in 
Bureaucracy, 62YALE LJ. 348, 390 (1953). 
180 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:130 
relationship with nature. As a result, they may be more sensitive to 
subtle degradations of the environment that are missed by society 
at large. These environmental changes will often be too subtle for 
pre-Massachusetts standing doctrine. Armed with "special 
solicitude," however, Indian tribes can sound the alarm of 
impending environmental doom by going to court and requiring 
adherence to the law by the United States. 
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